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Foundationalism

Foundationalism

Foundationalism is any theory in epistemology (typically, theories of justification, but also of knowledge) that holds that beliefs are justified (known, etc.) based on what are called basic beliefs (also commonly called foundational beliefs). Basic beliefs are beliefs that give justificatory support to other beliefs, and more derivative beliefs are based on those more basic beliefs. The basic beliefs are said to be self-justifying or self-evident, that is, they are justified, although not justified by other beliefs. Typically and historically, foundationalists have held either that basic beliefs are justified by mental events or states, such as experiences, that do not constitute beliefs (these are called nondoxastic mental states), or that they simply are not the type of thing that can (or needs to be) justified. Hence, generally, a foundationalist might offer the following theory of justification: :A belief is epistemically justified if and only if (1) it is justified by a basic belief or beliefs, or (2) it is justified by a chain of beliefs that is supported by a basic belief or beliefs, and on which all the others are ultimately based. A basic belief, on the other hand, does not require justification because it is a different kind of belief than a non-foundational one.

Arguments for Foundationalism

Foundationalists generally tend to argue that there must be some set of epistemologically basic propositions or else the process of justification will always lead to an infinite regress, like a four-year old constantly asking "why?" See the regress argument in epistemology.

Historical foundationalism: rationalism vs. empiricism

Historically, two varieties of foundationalist theories were rationalism (or continental rationalism, to refer to the historical movement) and empiricism (or Empiricism, or British Empiricism). Strictly speaking, neither empiricism nor rationalism is committed to foundationalism (it is possible to be an empiricist coherentist, for example, and that was a common epistemological position in 20th century philosophy). Rationalism is the general name for epistemological theories that maintain that reason is the source and criterion of knowledge. Rationalists generally hold that so-called truths of reason are the (most important) epistemologically basic propositions. The historical continental rationalism expounded by René Descartes rejected empiricism entirely, while modern rationalism asserts that reason is strongest when it is supported by or consistent with evidence and hence relies heavily on empirical science in analyzing justifications for belief. René Descartes famously held that some of these truths are known innately and therefore constitute epistemologically basic innate knowledge, a view not commonly held in modern rationalism. Empiricism is the general name for epistemological theories that maintain that sensation reports are the source and criterion of knowledge. Classical empiricists generally held that such reports are indubitable and incorrigible and therefore worthy of serving as epistemologically basic propositions.

Alternatives to foundationalism

Alternatives to foundationalism include coherentism and reliabilism (though this has sometimes been construed as an unusual variant of foundationalism). Contextualism (or, in a stripped-down version, the blind posits theory) is the epistemological version of relativism; relativism is more often regarded as a theory of truth than as a theory of justification or knowledge. Also see Pragmatism.

External links

- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry] Category:Epistemology Category:Philosophical theories

Epistemic self-justification

In epistemology, a self-evident proposition is one that can be understood only by one who knows that it is true. A self-evident proposition is one that can be known to be true without proof (but only by understanding what it says). Some epistemologists deny that any proposition can be self-evident. My belief that I am conscious is considered by many to be self-evident; your belief that I am conscious is not. Some examples of metaphysical propositions said to be self-evident include "A finite whole is greater than any of its parts" and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time in the same manner." Some examples of moral propositions said to be self-evident as cited by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist #31 include "The means ought to be proportioned to the end", "Every power ought to be commensurate with its object" and "There ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation." In informal or colloquial speech, "self-evident" often merely means "obvious." Certain forms of argument from self-evidence are considered fallacious or abusive in debate. An example is the assertion that since an opponent disagrees with a (claimed self-evident) proposition, that he must have misunderstood it. Compare with: the concepts of primitive notion and axiom in mathematics. It is sometimes said that a self-evident proposition is one whose denial is self-contradictory. It is also sometimes said that an analytic proposition is one whose denial is self-contradictory. But these two uses of the term self-contradictory mean entirely different things. A self-evident proposition cannot be denied without knowing that one contradicts oneself (provided one actually understands the proposition). An analytic proposition cannot be denied without a contradiction, but one may fail to know that there is a contradiction because it may be a contradiction that can be found only by a long and abstruse line of logical or mathematical reasoning. Most analytic propositions are very far from self-evident. Similarly, a self-evident proposition need not be analytic: my knowledge that I am conscious is self-evident but not analytic. That being said, an analytic proposition, however long a chain of reasoning it takes to establish it, ultimately contains a tautology, and is thus only a verbal truth--a truth established through the verbal equivalence of a single meaning. For those who admit the existence of abstract concepts, the class of non-analytic self-evident truths can be regarded as truths of the understanding--truths revealing connections between the meanings of ideas. One of the most famous examples of claims to the self-evidence of a truth is found in the Declaration of Independence. The proposition that "all men are created equal" is not necessarily self-evident in a philosophically respectable sense, and the propositions which follow surely are not. However many would agree that the proposition "we ought to treat subjects known to be equal in a certain sense equally in regard to that sense" is self-evident. On the other hand the propositions described can be (as Thomas Jefferson proposed) "held" to be self-evident as the basis for practical, even revolutionary, behaviors. Category:Epistemology

Theory of justification

Theory of justification is that part of epistemology that attempts to understand the justification of statements and beliefs.

Introduction

Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of justification, warrant, rationality, and probability. Of these four terms, the term that has been most widely used and discussed in the past twenty years is justification. Stephen Pepper (1942), in his "world hypothesis" theory of the history of epistemology, uses the term warrant. The theory of justification attempts to answer questions such as "What is justification?" or "When is a belief justified, and when not?"

Subjects of justification

Many things can be justified. Beliefs, actions, emotions, claims, laws, theories and so on. Epistemology focuses on beliefs. In part this is because of the influence of the Theaetetus account of knowledge as "justified true belief". More generally, the theory of justification focuses on the justification of statements or propositions.

Justification is a normative activity

One way of explaining the theory of justification is to say: A justified belief is one which we are within our rights in holding. By this is meant, not political rights, or moral rights, but "intellectual" rights. In some way each of us is responsible for what we believe. We don't just go off and believe anything. We each have an intellectual responsibility or obligation, to believe what is true and to avoid believing what is false. Being intellectually responsible involves being within one's intellectual rights in believing something; in such cases one is justified in one's belief. Thus, justification is a normative notion. That means that it has to do with norms, rights, responsibilities, obligations, and so forth. The standard definition is that a concept is normative iff it is a concept regarding or depending on the norms, or obligations and permissions (very broadly construed), involved in human conduct. It is generally accepted that the concept of justification is normative, because it is defined as a concept regarding the norms of belief.

Justifiers

If a belief is justified, there is something which justifies it. The thing which justifies a belief can be called its justifier. If a belief is justified, then it has at least one justifier. An example of a justifier would be some evidence that I accept. For example, if a woman is aware of the fact that her husband returned from a business trip smelling like perfume, and that his shirt has smudged lipstick on its collar, the perfume and the lipstick can be evidence for her belief that her husband is having an affair. In that case, the justifiers are all the perfume and the lipstick, or more specifically her acceptance of that evidence; the belief that is justified is her belief that her husband is having an affair. Not all justifiers would have to be what can properly be called "evidence"; there might be some totally different kind of justifiers out there. But to be justified, a belief has to have a justifier. But this raises an important question: What sort of thing can be a justifier? Three things that have been suggested are: # Beliefs only. # Beliefs together with other conscious mental states. # Beliefs, conscious mental states, and other facts about us and our environment (which we may not have access to). At least sometimes, the justifier of a belief is another belief. When, to return to the earlier example, the woman believes that her husband is having an affair she bases that belief on other beliefs — namely, the lipstick and perfume. Strictly speaking, her belief isn't based on the evidence itself — after all, what if she did not believe it? What if she thought that all of that evidence were just a hoax? For that matter, what if the evidence existed, but she did not know about it? Then of course, her belief that her husband is having an affair wouldn't be based on that evidence, because she did not know it was there at all; or, if she thought the evidence were a hoax, then surely her belief couldn't be based on that evidence. When a belief is based on evidence, actually what my belief is based on is another belief, namely, a belief or beliefs about the evidence. Consider a belief P. Either P is justified, or P is not justified. If P is justified, then another belief Q may be justified by P. If P is not justified, then P cannot be a justifier for any other belief: neither for Q, nor for Q's negation. For example, suppose someone might believe that there is intelligent life on Mars, and base this belief on a further belief, that there is a feature on the surface of Mars that looks like a face, and that this face could only have been made by intelligent life. So the justifying belief is: That face-like feature on Mars could only have been made by intelligent life. And the justified belief is: There is intelligent life on Mars. But suppose further that the justifying belief is itself totally unjustified. One would in no way be in one's intellectual rights to suppose that this face-like feature on Mars could have only been made by intelligent life; that view would be totally irresponsible, intellectually speaking. Such a belief would be unjustified. It has a justifier, but the justifier is itself not justified. A belief can only be justified by some belief which is itself justified; notably with exception of the belief that one is capable, at least in principle, to distinguish a belief which is justified from one that's not. If a belief, Q, is justified by another belief, P, then P must itself be justified.

Commonly used justifiers

- Scientific method
- Occam's Razor
- Empiricism
- Induction See also: knowledge (philosophy) Category:Epistemology

The regress argument in epistemology

The Regress Argument (also known as The Problem of Criterion and the diallelus) is a problem in epistemology and, in general, a problem in any situation where a statement has to be justified. According to this argument, any proposition requires a justification. However, any justification itself requires support, since nothing is true “just because”. This means that any proposition whatsoever can be endlessly questioned, like a child who asks "why?" over and over again. Taken at face value, the Regression Argument leads to skepticism.

Origin

The argument is usually attributed to Sextus Empiricus, and has been restated by Agrippa as part of what has become known as "Agrippa's Trilemma". The argument can be seen as a response to the claim in Plato's Theaetetus that knowledge is justified true belief. A skeptic wishes to argue that knowledge was impossible. Whatever argument I may offer to justify some belief, I must offer another in turn to justify my contention that this argument justifies the belief, and then offer another to justify that argument, and so on to infinite regress. It appears, therefore, that it is simply not possible to justify a statement, and that since knowledge is justified true belief, knowledge is impossible.

Formal statement of the argument

Assuming that knowledge is justified true belief: # Suppose that P is some true belief. For it to count as knowledge, it must be justified. # That justification will be another statement – let's call it P'; so P' justifies P. # But if P' is to be a satisfactory justification for P, then we must know that P' is the case. # But in order to know that P' is the case, it must itself be justified. # That justification will be another statement - let's call it P"; so P" justifies P'. # We are now back in the same position as in 3, but in this case with P" in place of P'. This presents us with three possibilities: the sequence never finishes; or some statements do not need justification; or the chain of reasoning loops back on itself.

Skepticism

Perhaps the chain goes on forever. This possibility (called regressism) never provides an adequate justification for any statement in the chain. This would mean that it is not possible to satisfy the criterion for a statement being knowledge — that it be justified true belief. Skepticism would be the only option.

Foundationalism

Perhaps the chain begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief. Such beliefs are called basic beliefs. In this solution, which is called foundationalism, all beliefs are justified by basic beliefs. Foundationalism is a form of dogmatism. Foundationalism is the belief that a chain of justification begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief. Thus, a belief is justified iff: #it is a basic/foundational belief (i.e., it is justified by a non belief), or it is justified by a basic belief or beliefs #it is justified by a chain of beliefs that is ultimately justified by a basic belief or beliefs. An analogy to explain this idea compares foundationalism to a building. Ordinary individual beliefs occupy the upper stories of the building; basic, or foundational beliefs are down in the basement, in the foundation of the building, holding everything else up. In a similar way, individual beliefs, say about economics or ethics, rest on more basic beliefs, say about the nature of human beings; and those rest on still more basic beliefs, say about the mind; and in the end the entire system rests on a set of beliefs, basic beliefs, which are not justified by other beliefs, but instead by something else. Foundationalism seeks to escape the regress argument by claiming that there are some beliefs for which it is improper to ask for a justification. A belief is basic iff it is justified, but it is not justified by other beliefs. This requires that sensory perception justify basic beliefs. Others claim that an event of perception can begin a chain of belief. An objection to this idea is that a hallucination can cause an event of perception without corresponding to reality. Foundationalists support their idea by claiming that sense experience can be a belief in itself. For example, suppose that one claims that one had fallen and scraped one's knee as a child. With no witnesses or other records, there is no fact which can support this belief except that one remembers it. In effect, the belief that one scraped one's knee is supported by one's memory of having scraped one's knee. This raises the question of what it is that makes one believe that one is justified in believing this sensory memory. Ultimately, then, this sensory belief is justified by another belief, that one's memory is reliable and true.

Coherentism

Finally, perhaps the chain loops around on itself, forming a circle. In this case, the justification of any statement is used, after a long chain of reasoning, in justifying itself, and the argument is circular. This is a naïve version of coherentism. Coherentism is the belief that an idea is justified iff it is part of a coherent system of mutually supporting beliefs (i.e., beliefs that support each other). In effect Coherentism denies that justification can only take the form of a chain. Coherentism replaces the chain with a holistic approach. The most common objection to naïve Coherentism is that it implies that circular justification is acceptable. Meaning that in this view, P ultimately supports P, which is not an acceptable form of reasoning; this logical error is called begging the question. Coherentists reply that it is not just P that is supporting P, but P along with the totality of the other statements in the whole system of belief. Another issue is that it accepts any belief that is part of a coherent system of beliefs. In contrast, P can cohere with P' and P" without P, P' or P" being true. To respond that the system of beliefs has to be derived from experience in reality would be to replace Coherentism with a form of foundationalism. Instead, Coherentists might say that it is very unlikely that the whole system would be both untrue and consistent, and that if some part of the system was untrue, it would almost certainly be inconsistent with some other part of the system. A third objection is that some beliefs arise from experience and not from other beliefs. An example is that one is looking into a room which is totally dark. The lights turn on momentarily and one sees a white canopy bed in the room. The belief that there is a white canopy bed in this room is based entirely on experience and not on any other belief. Of course, possibilities exist, such as that the white canopy bed is entirely an illusion or that one is hallucinating, but the belief remains well-justified. Coherentists might respond that the belief which supports the belief that there is a white canopy bed in this room is that one saw the bed, however briefly. This appears to be an immediate qualifier which does not depend on other beliefs, and thus seems to prove that Coherentism is not true because beliefs can be justified by concepts other than beliefs. However the experience of seeing the bed is indeed dependent on other beliefs, about what a bed, a canopy and so on, actually look like.

Other views

Common Sense

The method of common sense espoused by such philosophers as Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore points out that whenever we investigate anything at all, whenever we start thinking about some subject, we have to make assumptions. One tries to support one’s assumptions with reasons, one must make yet more assumptions. Since it is inevitable that we will make some assumptions, why not assume those things that are most obvious, the matters of common sense that no one ever seriously doubts. "Common sense" here does not mean old adages like "Chicken soup is good for colds" but statements about the background in which our experiences occur. Examples would be "Human beings typically have two eyes, two ears, two hands, two feet", or "The world has a ground and a sky" or "Plants and animals come in a wide variety of sizes and colors" or "I am conscious and alive right now". These are all the absolutely most obvious sorts of claims that one could possibly make; and, said Reid and Moore, these are the claims that make up common sense. This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of Coherentism. In this case, commonsense statements are statements that are so crucial to keeping the account coherent that they are all but impossible to deny. If the method of common sense is correct, then philosophers may take the principles of common sense for granted. They do not need criteria in order to judge whether a proposition is true or not. They can also take some justifications for granted, according to common sense. They can get around Sextus' problem of the criterion because there is no infinite regress or circle of reasoning, because the buck stops with the principles of common sense.

Critical philosophy

Another escape from the diallelus is critical philosophy, which denies that beliefs should ever be justified at all. Rather, the job of philosophers is to subject all beliefs (including beliefs about truth criteria) to criticism, attempting to discredit them rather than justifying them. Then, these philosophers say, it is rational to act on those beliefs that have best withstood criticism, whether or not they meet any specific criterion of truth. Karl Popper expanded on this idea to include a quantitative measurement he called verisimilitude, or truth-likeness. He showed that even if one could never justify a particular claim, one can compare the verisimilitude of two competing claims by criticism to judge which is superior to the other.

Pragmatism

The pragmatist philosopher William James suggests that, ultimately, everyone settles at some level of explanation based on one’s personal preferences that fit the particular individuals psychological needs. People select whatever level of explanation fits their needs, and things other than logic and reason determine those needs. In The Sentiment of Rationality, James compares the philosopher, who insists on high degree of justification, and the boor, who accepts or rejects ideals without much thought: “The philosopher’s logical tranquillity is thus in essence no other than the boor’s. They differ only as to the point at which each refuses to let further considerations upset the absoluteness of the data he assumes.” Category:Philosophical arguments

Continental rationalism

:A separate article deals with a different philosophical position called rationalism. ---- Continental rationalism is an approach to philosophy based on the thesis that human reason can in principle be the source of all knowledge. It originated with René Descartes and spread during the 17th and 18th centuries, primarily in continental Europe. In contrast, the contemporary approach known as British Empiricism held that all ideas come to us through experience, and thus that knowledge (with the possible exception of mathematics) is essentially empirical. At issue is the fundamental source of human knowledge, and the proper techniques for verifying what we think we know (see Epistemology). The distinction between Rationalists and Empiricists was drawn at a later period, and would not have been recognised by the philosophers involved. Also, the distinction wasn't as clear-cut as is sometimes suggested; for example, the three main Rationalists were all committed to the importance of empirical science, and in many respects the Empiricists were closer to Descartes in their methods and metaphysical theories than were Spinoza and Leibniz. Thus, although it can be useful when organising courses or writing books, the distinction is less useful philosophically. Rationalists typically argued that, starting with intuitively-understood basic principles, like the axioms of geometry, one could deductively derive the rest of knowledge. The philosophers who held this view most clearly were Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, whose attempts to grapple with the epistemological and metaphysical problems raised by Descartes led to a development of the fundamental approach of Rationalism. Both Spinoza and Leibniz thought that, in principle, all knowledge – including scientific knowledge – could be gained through the use of reason alone, though they both accepted that in practice this wasn't possible for human beings except in specific areas such as maths. Descartes, on the other hand, was closer to Plato, thinking that only knowledge of eternal truths – including the truths of mathematics, and the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the sciences – could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method. It would perhaps be most accurate to say that he was a Rationalist with regard to metaphysics, but an Empiricist with regard to the sciences. Immanuel Kant started as a Rationalist, but after being exposed to David Hume's works which "awoke [him] from [his] dogmatic slumbers", he attempted to synthesise the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions. The more modern usage of the term "rationalist" refers to the belief that human behaviour and beliefs should be based on reason — a belief shared by continental rationalists and empiricists alike (see rationalism).

External links

- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Rationalism vs. Empiricism] Category:Epistemology ja:合理主義哲学

Empiricism

Empiricism comes from the Greek word εμπειρισμός, a noun meaning a "test" or "trial". The -pir- is ultimately related to the -per- of the Latin words experientia and experimentum, both of which mean "experiment," and from which our words "experiment" and "experience" come. (Interestingly, it is also related to the Latin word periculum, "essay, trial, danger," which gives the English word "peril".) Empiricism is therefore the philosophical doctrine (-ism) of "testing" or "experimentation," and has taken on the more specific meaning that all human knowledge ultimately comes from the senses and from experience. Empiricism denies that humans have innate ideas or that anything is knowable without reference to experience. Empiricism is contrasted with continental rationalism, epitomized by René Descartes. According to the rationalist, philosophy should be performed via introspection and a priori deductive reasoning. Names associated with empiricism include St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes (also see naturalism), Francis Bacon, John Locke (who originally developed the doctrine during the 17th and early 18th centuries), George Berkeley, and David Hume. It is generally regarded as the heart of the modern scientific method, that present theories should be based on our observations of the world rather than on intuition or faith; that is, empirical research and a posteriori inductive reasoning rather than purely deductive logic. Empirical is an adjective often used in conjunction with science, both the natural and social sciences, which means the use of working hypotheses which are capable of being disproved using observation or experiment (ie: ultimately through experience). In a second sense "empirical" in science may be synonymous with "experimental". In this sense, an empirical result is an experimental observation. In this context, the term "semi-empirical" or "semiempirical" is used for qualifying theoretical methods which use in part basic axioms or postulated scientific laws and empirical (experimental) results. Such methods are opposed to theoretical ab initio methods which are purely deductive and based on first principles. This terminology is particularly important in theoretical chemistry.

Empiricism and Science

Empiricism was a precursor of logical positivism, also known as logical empiricism. Empirical methods have dominated science until the present day. It laid the groundwork for the scientific method, which is the traditional view of theory and progress in science. However, in the past couple of decades quantum mechanics, constructivism, and Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions have created some challenges to empiricism as the exclusive way in which science works and should work. On the other hand, some argue that theories such as quantum mechanics provide a perfect example of the solidity of empiricism: the ability to discover even counter-intuitive scientific laws, and the ability to rework our theories to accept these laws.

Empiricism in history

Within historiography, empiricism refers to empiricist historiography, a school of documentary interpretation and historical teleology derived from the works of Ranke.

Classical Empiricism

Refers mostly to the epistemological work of St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle. Aristotle argued that all forms of knowing come from induction. Aquinas wrote the famous peripatetic axiom, "Nihil in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu" which means "Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses."

Modern Empiricism

Also known as traditional empiricism. David Hume, John Locke and George Berkeley were among the British philosophers who rejected the theory of innate ideas. Theories of the existence of innate ideas were the subject of much debate between the Continental rationalists and British empiricists in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century David Hume was critical of Immanuel Kant's doctrine of the a priori as positing innate ideas, while proponents of innate ideas rejected Kant's doctrine of intuition and deduction as not innatist, but part of a rationalist doctrine. Modern empiricism contends that all knowledge must be attained through internal and external sensations.

Radical Empiricism

Radical empiricists believe that all human knowledge is purely empirical. William James was a proponent of one form of radical empiricism.

Moderate Empiricism

Moderate empiricists believe that all human knowledge of "matter of fact propositions" is purely empirical. This is the view that David Hume held.

Other forms

Naïve Empiricism: Our ideas and theories need to be tested against reality and not be affected by preconceived notions. Constructive Empiricism: According to this view of science coined by Bas C. van Fraassen (The Scientific Image, 1980), we should only ask that theories accurately describe observable parts of the world. Theories that meet these requirements are considered "empirically adequate". If a theory becomes well established, it should be "accepted". What that means is the theory is believed to be empirically accurate, used to solve further problems, and used to extend or refine the theory.

Criticisms

Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

One of the most famous challenges against empiricism is Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), which built upon Norwood Russell Hanson's Patterns of Discovery (1958). In this, he argues that theory change is actually developed through paradigm shifts, where a new idea is offered that doesn't follow on existing theories but instead offers a unique, creative solution to existing problems. Scientific thinking, in Kuhn's view, goes through revolutions, instead of gradual theory development through testing and experimentation. After the revolution occurs, scientists can see things they weren't able to see before in the former framework. Kuhn also questioned whether scientific experimentation is truly unbiased and neutral since the experimenter had previous theories and preconceptions which could affect what experiments are chosen and the way in which the results are interpreted. Kuhn also questioned whether we can trust the reliability of our senses, and cited the famous illusions printed in Hanson's 1958 book.

Constructivism

Knowledge and reality is actively constructed by the individual, not passively received from the environment. There are many forms of constructivism, such as social constructivism and cultural constructivism.

Quantum mechanics

Addresses the question whether experience can be used to determine an ontological reality. For example, the Many-worlds interpretation, one of the answers to the EPR paradox, argues that there are multiple versions of every observed object in every possible observable state, existing in a state of Quantum superposition. If every observable entity within our reality has a counterpart in an alternate state, then our experience of these entities does not indicate any ontological reality.

External links

- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Rationalism vs. Empiricism] ko:경험론 ja:経験論

British empiricism

Empiricism and Science

Empiricism in history

Within historiography, empiricism refers to empiricist historiography, a school of documentary interpretation and historical teleology derived from the works of Ranke.

Classical Empiricism

Modern Empiricism

Radical Empiricism

Radical empiricists believe that all human knowledge is purely empirical. William James was a proponent of one form of radical empiricism.

Moderate Empiricism

Moderate empiricists believe that all human knowledge of "matter of fact propositions" is purely empirical. This is the view that David Hume held.

Other forms

Criticisms

Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Constructivism

Quantum mechanics

External links

- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Rationalism vs. Empiricism] ko:경험론 ja:経験論

Continental rationalism

External links

- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Rationalism vs. Empiricism] Category:Epistemology ja:合理主義哲学

René Descartes

:For other things named Descartes, see Descartes (disambiguation). René Descartes (IPA: , March 31, 1596 – February 11, 1650), also known as Cartesius, was a noted French philosopher and mathematician. Descartes, dubbed the Founder of Modern Philosophy and the Father of Modern Mathematics, ranks as one of the most important and influential thinkers in modern western history. As the inventor of the Cartesian coordinate system, he formulated the basis of modern geometry (analytic geometry), which in turn influenced the development of modern calculus. He inspired his contemporaries and subsequent generations of philosophers, leading to the formation of what is known today as continental rationalism, a philosophical position which developed in 17th and 18th century Europe. His most famous statement is Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am.).

Biography

Descartes was born in La Haye en Touraine, Indre-et-Loire, France. At the age of eight, he entered the Jesuit Collège Royal Henry-Le-Grand at La Flèche. After graduation, he studied at the University of Poitiers, earning a Baccalauréat and Licence in law in 1616. Descartes never actually practiced law, however, and in 1618 he entered the service of Prince Maurice of Nassau, leader of the United Provinces of the Netherlands. His intention was to see the world and to discover the truth. :"I entirely abandoned the study of letter. Resolving to seek no knowledge other than that which could be found in myself or else in the great book of the world, I spent the rest of my youth traveling, visiting courts and armies, mixing with people of diverse temperaments and ranks, gathering various experiences, testing myself in the situations which fortune offered me, and at all times reflecting upon whatever came my way so as to derive some profit from it. (Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences) Here he met Isaac Beeckman who sparks his interest in mathematics and the new physics. On November 10, 1619, while traveling in Germany and thinking about using mathematics to solve problems in physics, Descartes had a vision in a dream through which he "discovered the foundations of a marvelous science." This became a pivotal point in young Descartes' life and the foundation on which he develops analytical geometry. He dedicated the rest of his life to researching this connection between mathematics and nature. In 1622 he returned to France, and during the next few years spent time in Paris and other parts of Europe. Descartes was present at the siege of La Rochelle by Cardinal Richelieu in 1627. He left for Holland in 1628, where he lived and changed his address frequently until 1649. In 1633, Galileo was condemned by the Catholic Church, and Descartes abandoned plans to publish Treatise on the World, his work of the previous four years. His daughter Francine was born in 1635 and was baptized on August 7 of the same year. She died in 1640. Descartes continued to publish works concerning mathematics and philosophy for the rest of his life. In 1643, Cartesian philosophy was condemned at the University of Utrecht, and Descartes began his long correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. In 1647, he was awarded a pension by the King of France. Descartes was interviewed by Frans Burman at Egmond-Binnen in 1648. In 1649, Descartes went to Sweden on invitation of professor Eitan Olevsky. René Descartes died on February 11, 1650 in Stockholm, Sweden, where he had been invited as a teacher for Queen Christina of Sweden. The cause of death was said to be pneumonia - accustomed to working in bed till noon, he may have suffered a detrimental effect on his health due to Christina's demands for early morning study. However, letters to and from the doctor Eike Pies have recently been discovered which indicate that Descartes may have been poisoned using arsenic. In 1667, the Roman Catholic Church placed his works on the Index of Prohibited Books. As a Catholic in a Protestant nation, he was interred in a graveyard mainly used for unbaptized infants in Adolf Fredrikskyrkan in Stockholm. Later, his remains were taken to France and buried in the Church of St. Genevieve-du-Mont in Paris. A memorial erected in the 18th century remains in the Swedish church. During the French Revolution, his remains were disinterred for burial in the Panthéon among the great French thinkers. The village in the Loire Valley where he was born was renamed La Haye - Descartes in 1802, which was shortened to "Descartes" in 1967. Currently his tomb is in the church Saint Germain-des-Pres in Paris.

Significance

Philosophical legacy

Descartes is often regarded as the first modern thinker to provide a philosophical framework for the natural sciences as these began to develop. In his Meditations on First Philosophy he attempts to arrive at a fundamental set of principles that one can know as true without any doubt. To achieve this, he employs a method called methodological skepticism: he doubts any idea that can be doubted. He gives the example of dreaming: in a dream, one's senses perceive stimuli that seem real, but do not actually exist. Thus, one cannot rely on the data of the senses as necessarily true. Or, perhaps an "evil demon" exists: a supremely powerful and cunning being who sets out to try to deceive Descartes from knowing the true nature of reality. Given these possibilities, what can one know for certain? Initially, Descartes arrives at only a single principle: if I am being deceived, then surely "I" must exist. Most famously, this is known as cogito ergo sum, ("I think, therefore I am"). (These words do not appear in the Meditations, although he had written them in his earlier work Discourse on Method). Therefore, Descartes concludes that he can be certain that he exists. But in what form? He perceives his body through the use of the senses; however, these have previously proved unreliable. So Descartes concludes that the only undoubtable knowledge is that he is a thinking thing. Thinking is his essence as it is the only thing about him that cannot be doubted. To further demonstrate the limitations of the senses, Descartes proceeds with what is known as the Wax Argument. He considers a piece of wax: his senses inform him that it has certain characteristics, such as shape, texture, size, color, smell, and so forth. However, when he brings the wax towards a flame, these characteristics change completely. However, it seems that it is still the same thing: it is still a piece of wax, even though the data of the senses inform him that all of its characteristics are different. Therefore, in order to properly grasp the nature of the wax, he cannot use the senses: he must use his mind. Descartes concludes: :"Thus what I thought I had seen with my eyes, I actually grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in my mind." In this manner, Descartes proceeds to construct a system of knowledge, discarding perception as unreliable and instead admitting only deduction as a method. Halfway through the Meditations, he also claims to prove the existence of a benevolent God, who, being benevolent, has provided him with a working mind and sensory system, and who cannot desire to deceive him, and thus, finally, he establishes the possibility of acquiring knowledge about the world based on deduction and perception.

Mathematical legacy

Rene Descartes said "Nature can be defined through numbers." Mathematicians consider Descartes of the utmost importance for his discovery of analytic geometry. Up to Descartes's times, geometry, dealing with lines and shapes, and algebra, dealing with numbers, appeared as completely different subsets of mathematics. Descartes showed how to translate many problems in geometry into problems in algebra, by using a coordinate system to describe the problem. Descartes's theory provided the basis for the calculus of Newton and Leibniz, by applying infinitesimal calculus to the tangent problem, thus permitting the evolution of that branch of modern mathematics . This appears even more astounding when one keeps in mind that the work was just intended as an example to his Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la verité dans les sciences (Discourse on the Method to Rightly Conduct the Reason and Search for the Truth in Sciences, known better under the shortened title Discours de la méthode). Descartes also made contributions in the field of Optics, for instance, he showed by geometrical construction using the Law of Refraction that the angular radius of a rainbow is 42° (i.e. the angle subtended at the eye by the edge of the rainbow and the ray passing from the sun through the rainbow's centre is 42°).

Writings by Descartes

- Compendium Musicae (1618)
- Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1628)
- Discourse on Method (1637): an introduction to "Dioptrique', on the "Météores' and 'La Géométrie'; a work for the grand public, written in French.
- La Géométrie (1637)
- Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), also known as 'Metaphysic meditations', with a series of six Objections and Replies. This work was written in Latin, language of the learned. A second edition was published a year later with all seven sets of the objections and replies followed by Letter to Dinet.
- Les Principes de la philosophie (Principles of Philosophy) (1644), work rather destined for the students.
- The Singing Epitaph (1646)
- Comments on a Certain Broadsheet (1647)
- The Description of the Human Body (1647)
- Conversation with Burman (1648)
- Passions of the Soul (1649), dedicated to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia

Trivia

It is claimed that during the 1640s Descartes travelled with an artificial female companion called Francine, named after his daughter. This may be a myth linked with his statements about the nature of the mind, or an early automaton, or Gynoid. Descartes was ranked #49 on Michael H. Hart's list of the most influential figures in history. His name roughly means "reborn of charts/maps" depending on the definition of cartes used. The Descartes Highlands area on the moon where John Young and Charles Duke landed with Apollo 16 is named after him.

References

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External links

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- [http://www.shvoong.com/books/philosophy/55185-discourse-method/ A summary of his book "A Discourse On Method"]
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- Translations of Descartes' Meditations: [http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/mede.html]
- [http://www.incipitblog.com/index.php/2005/06/01/rene-descartes-discours-de-la-methode-1637/ French Audio Book (mp3)] : excerpt about animals/machines from Discourse On the Method
- [http://gutenberg.net/etext/59 Discourse On the Method] – at Project Gutenberg
- [http://gutenberg.net/etext/4391 Selections from the Principles of Philosophy] – at Project Gutenberg
- [http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Descartes.html Detailed biography of Descartes]
- [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04744b.htm CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Rene Descartes]
- [http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/ READABLE versions of Descartes's Meditations and Discourse on the Method.]
- [http://www.borishennig.de/texte/descartes/diss/cartes_04b.pdf Conscientia in Descartes]
- [http://descartes.sourceforge.net/ descartes], an open source function plotter named after the inventor of Cartesian coordinates
- [http://www.biblioweb.org/-DESCARTES-Rene-.html Biography, Bibliography, Analysis] (in French)
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/ Descartes' Epistemology]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ethics/ Descartes' Ethics]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-works/ Descartes' Life and Works]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-modal/ Descartes' Modal Metaphysics]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ Descartes' Ontological Argument]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/ Descartes and the Pineal Gland] Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene Descartes, Rene ko:르네 데카르트 ja:ルネ・デカルト simple:René Descartes th:เรอเน เดส์การตส์

René Descartes

Biography

Significance

Philosophical legacy

Mathematical legacy

Writings by Descartes

Trivia

References

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External links

Coherentism

There are two distinct types of coherentism. One refers to the coherence theory of truth. The other is belief in the coherence theory of justification — an epistemological theory opposing foundationalism and offering a solution to the regress argument. In this epistemological capacity, it is a theory about how belief can be justified. As a theory of truth coherentism restricts true sentences to those that cohere with some specified set of sentences. Someone's belief is true just in the case that it is coherent with all or most of their other beliefs. Usually, coherence is taken to imply something stronger than mere consistency. Statements that are comprehensive and meet the requirements of Occam's razor are usually to be preferred. The remainder of this article deals with the coherence theory of justification.

The regress argument

The regress argument says that, given some statement P, it appears reasonable to ask for a justification for P. If that justification takes the form of another statement, P', one can again reasonably ask for a justification for P', and so forth. There are three possible outcomes to this questioning process: # the series is infinitely long, with every statement justified by some other statement. # the series forms a loop, so that each statement is ultimately involved in its own justification. # the series terminates with some statements that are not justified. An infinite series appears to offer little help, since it is basically impossible to check that each justification is satisfactory. Relying on such a series quickly leads to scepticism. A loop begs the question. Coherentism is sometimes characterised as accepting that the series forms a loop, but although this would produce a form of Coherentism, this is not what is generally meant by the term.

Foundationalism

One might conclude that there must be some statements that, for some reason, do not need justification. This view is called foundationalism. For instance, rationalists such as Descartes and Spinoza developed axiomatic systems that relied on statements that were taken to be self-evident: 'I think therefore I am' is the most famous example. Similarly, empiricists take observations as providing the foundation for the series. Foundationalism relies on the uneasy claim that it is not reasonable to ask for justification of certain propositions. If someone makes an observational statement, such as 'it is raining', it does seem reasonable to ask how they know - did they look out the window? Did someone else tell them? Did they just come in shaking their umbrella? Coherentism insists that it is always reasonable to ask for a justification for any statement. Coherentism contends that foundationalism provides an arbitrary spot to stop asking for justification and so that it does not provide reasons to think that certain beliefs do not need justification.

Coherentism

Coherentism denies the validity of the regression argument. The regression argument makes the assumption that the justification for a proposition takes the form of another proposition: P" justifies P', which in turn justifies P. For coherentism, justification is a holistic process. P is not justified as a part of some inferential chain of reasoning, but because it coheres with some system of which it forms a part. Usually the system is taken to be the complete set of beliefs of the individual or group, that is, their theory of the world. It is necessary for coherentism to explain in some detail what it means for a system to be coherent. At the least, coherence must include logical consistency. It also usually requires some degree of integration of the various components of the system. A system that contains more than one unrelated explanation of the same phenomenon is not as coherent as one that uses only one explanation, all other things being equal. Conversely, a theory that explains divergent phenomena using unrelated explanations is not as coherent as one that uses only one explanation for those divergent phenomena. These requirements are variations on Occam's Razor. The same points can be made more formally using Bayesian statistics. Finally, the greater the number of phenomena explained by the system, the greater its coherence.

Difficulties for coherentism

The main criticism facing coherentism is probably simplest to state from the point of view of someone who holds to the correspondence theory of truth. This states that there is no obvious way in which a coherent system relates to anything that might exist outside of it. So, it may be possible to construct a coherent theory of the world, which does not correspond to what actually occurs in the world. In other words, it appears to be entirely possible to develop a system that is entirely coherent and yet entirely untrue. It is surprisingly difficult to even state the problem from the point of view of a coherentist, because the phrase correspond to reality has a different meaning in a coherentist system. For a coherentist, reality is exactly the entire coherent system. It is simply not possible for a coherent theory not to correspond to reality, if reality is the very same thing as the entire coherent system. Put another way, coherentists might reply to the critic that any substantial system that was not true would by definition contain some contradictions, and so be incoherent. This should become clear by looking at the differences between a coherentist and correspondence account of a scientific advance. Newtonian mechanics was shown to be inconsistent with certain experiments, notably the Michelson-Morley experiment. The theory used by physicists was thereafter changed from Newtonian to relativistic mechanics. One who held to a correspondence theory might say that there was an apparent lack of correspondence between the model (physics) and reality, and that the model was altered in order that it correspond to the observed facts. A coherentist account might claim that before the Michelson-Morley experiment, Physics formed a coherent theory. But then the experiment was performed. These experimental results form a part of the account, yet the results were inconsistent with the expectations of the accepted theory. Thus the account was shown to be less coherent. This inconsistency was resolved by the development of Relativistic mechanics. Any lack of correspondence of the theory with reality may eventually lead to a lack of coherence within the theory, and this leads to a modification of the theory to restore its coherence. There would be little or no practical difference between a Coherentist account and a Correspondence account of theory change.

External links

- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry] Category:Epistemology Category:Philosophical theories

Reliabilism

Reliabilism, a category of theories in the philosophical discipline of epistemology, has been advanced both as a theory of knowledge and of justified belief (as well as other varieties of so-called positive epistemic status). As a theory of knowledge, reliabilism on one formulation can be roughly stated as follows: :One knows that p (p stands for any proposition--e.g., the sky is blue) if and only if one believes that p is true, and one has arrived at the belief that p through some reliable process. As a theory of justified belief, reliabilism can be formulated roughly as follows: :One has a justified belief that p if, and only if, the belief is the result of a reliable process. Moreover, a similar account can be given (and an elaborate version of this has been given by Alvin Plantinga) for such notions as 'warranted belief' or 'epistemically rational belief'. Leading proponents of reliablist theories of knowledge and justification have included Alvin Goldman, Marshall Swain, and more recently, Alvin Plantinga. Goldman's article "A Causal Theory of Knowing" (Journal of Philosophy, v. 64 (1967), pp. 357-372) is generally credited as being the first full treatment of the theory, though D. M. Armstrong is also regarded as an important source, and (according to Hugh Mellor) Frank Ramsey was the very first to state the theory, albeit in passing. On the classical or traditional analysis of 'knowledge', one must be justified in believing that p in order for that belief to constitute knowledge; the traditional analysis has it that knowledge is no more than justified true belief. Reliabilist theories of knowledge are sometimes presented as an alternative to that theory: rather than justification, all that is required is that the belief be the product of a reliable process. But reliabilism need not be regarded as an alternative, but instead as a further explication of the traditional analysis. On this view, those who offer reliabilist theories of justification further analyze the 'justification' part of the traditional analysis of 'knowledge' in terms of reliable processes. Not all reliabilists agree with such accounts of justification, but some do.

Objections to the Theory

Some find reliabilism objectionable because they believe it entails externalism, which is the view that one can have knowledge, or have a justified belief, despite not knowing (having "access" to) the evidence, or other circumstances, that make the belief justified. Most reliabilists maintain that a belief can be justified, or can constitute knowledge, even if the believer does not know about or understand the process that makes the belief reliable. In defending this view, reliabilists (and externalists generally) are apt to point to examples from simple acts of perception: if one sees a bird in the tree outside their window and thereby gains the belief that there is a bird in that tree, they might not at all understand the cognitive processes that account for their successful act of perception; nevertheless, it is the fact that the processes worked reliably that accounts for why their belief is justified. In short, they find they hold a belief about the bird, and that belief is justified if any is, but they are not acquainted at all with the processes that led to the belief and made them justified in having it. Of course, internalists do not let the debate rest there; see externalism (epistemology). Another of the most common objections to reliabilism, made first to Goldman's knowledge reliable process theory of knowledge and later to other reliabilist theories, is the so-called generality problem, as follows. For any given justified belief (or instance of knowledge), one can easily identify many different (concurrently operating) "processes" from which the belief results. My belief that there is a bird in the tree outside my window might be accorded a result of the process of forming beliefs on the basis of sense-perception, of visual sense-perception, of visual sense-perception through opaque surfaces in daylight, and so forth, down to a variety of different very specifically-described processes. Some of these processes might be statistically reliable, while others might not. It would no doubt be better to say, in any case, that we are choosing not which process to say resulted in the belief, but instead how to describe the process, out of the many different levels of generality on which it can be accurately described. Another objection to reliabilism is called the New Evil Demon Problem. The evil demon problem originally motivated skepticism, but can be resuited to object to reliabilist accounts as follows: If our experiences are controlled by an evil demon, it may be the case that we believe ourselves to be doing things that we are not doing. However, these beliefs are clearly justified, even though the processes that arive at these beliefs are consistently unreliable. Robert Brandom has called for a clarification of the role of belief in reliabilist theories. Brandom is concerned that unless the role of belief is stressed, reliabilism may attribute knowledge to things that would otherwise be considered incapable of possessing it. Brandon give the example of a parrot that has been trained to consistently respond to red visual stimuli by saying 'that's red'. The proposition is true, the mechanism that produced it is reliable, but Brandom is reluctant to say that the parrot knows it is seeing red because he thinks it cannot believe that it is. For Brandom, beliefs pertain to concepts: without the latter there can be no former. Concepts are products of the 'game of giving and asking for reasons'. Hence, only those entities capable of reasoning, through language in a social context, can for Brandom believe and thus have knowledge. Brandom may be regarded as hybridising externalist and internalist, allowing knowledge to be accounted for by reliable external process so long as a knower possess some internal understanding of why the belief is reliable. Category:Epistemology

Pragmatism

Pragmatism is belief of the teaching of philosophy which originated in the United States in the late 1800s. Pragmatism is characterized by the insistence on consequences, utility and practicality as vital components of meaning and truth. Pragmatism objects to the view that human concepts and intellect represent reality, and therefore stands in opposition to both formalist and rationalist schools of philosophy. Rather, pragmatism holds that it is only in the struggle of intelligent organisms with the surrounding environment that theories acquire significance, and only with a theory's success in this struggle that it becomes true. Pragmatism does not hold, however, that just anything that is useful or practical should be regarded as true, or anything that helps us to survive merely in the short-term; pragmatists argue that what should be taken as true is that which most contributes to the most human good over the longest course. In practice, this means that for pragmatists, theoretical claims should be tied to verification practices--i.e., that one should be able to make predictions and test them--and that ultimately the needs of humankind should guide the path of human inquiry.

American philosophy

Like any philosophical movement, the nature and content of pragmatism is a subject of considerable debate, whether it is one of exegesis (determining what the original pragmatists thought it was) or subtantive philosophical theory (what is the most defensible theory that satisfies certain goals). The term pragmatism was first used by William James, who attributed the doctrine to Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced 'purse'). Peirce later went on to disavow the term in favour of 'pragmaticism', in order to distinguish his views from those of William James and the other major pragmatist thinker, John Dewey. Peirce and James were colleagues at Harvard in the 1870s, and were members of the same 'metaphysical club' or philosophical discussion group (for an excellent account of which, see the Pulitzer-prize-winning book by Louis Menand). Dewey was educated in Vermont but is most commonly associated with the University of Chicago (though he also taught at Michigan and Columbia).

What is common to all three thinkers' philosophy - and with other loosely affiliated thinkers such as Oliver Wendell Holmes - is a broad emphasis on the primacy of the practical over the theoretical in inquiry in general (particularly philosophical inquiry). One famous aspect of this view is Peirce's insistence that contrary to Descartes' famous and influential method in the Meditations, doubt cannot be feigned or created for the purpose of conducting philosophical inquiry. Doubt, like belief, requires justification, that is, it arises from confrontation with some specific recalcitrant matter of fact (from what Dewey called a 'situation'), which unsettles our belief in some specific proposition. Inquiry is then the rationally self-controlled process of attempting to return to a settled state of belief about that proposition.

Hilary Putnam (a contemporary or 'neo' pragmatist) has characterised pragmatism in terms of these and other themes: (1) the primacy of practice, (2) the collapse of any broad-ranging fact/value dichotomy, (3) antiscepticism (or the view that sceptical doubt, like any doubt, requires justification in order to be genuine) and (4) fallibilism: there is never an absolute or metaphysical guarantee that a given belief is true and will never be revised. Indeed Putnam goes on to suggest that the reconciliation of (3) and (4) is the central claim of American pragmatism.

Perhaps the most notorious pragmatist view - its theory of truth - appears frequently in James' work, but occupies a much smaller portion of the work of Peirce and Dewey. This theory is often caricatured in contemporary literature as the view that 'truth is what works', or that any idea that has practical utility is true. In reality the theory is a great deal more subtle, and bears a striking resemblance to better respected contemporary views, particularly Crispin Wright's 'superassertibility' (see his book 'Truth & Objectivity').

Pragmatism in history

A useful general account of pragmatism's origins during the late 19th and early 20th centuries is