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Teleology

Teleology

Teleology is the supposition that there is design, purpose, directive principle, or finality in the works and processes of nature, and the philosophical study of that purpose. Teleology stands in contrast to philosophical naturalism, and both ask questions separate from the questions of science. While science investigates natural laws and phenomena, Philosophical naturalism and teleology investigate the existence or non-existence of an organizing principle behind those natural laws and phenonema. Philosophical naturalism asserts that there are no such principles. Teleology asserts that there are. For example, the view of philosophical naturalism is that man sees because he has eyes. Teleology, on the other hand, holds both that man sees because he has eyes and has eyes so that he can see. As Aristotle wrote in support of teleology, "Nature adapts the organ to the function, and not the function to the organ" (De partib., animal., IV, xii, 694b; 13). Lucretius replied in support of philosophical naturalism: "Nothing in the body is made in order that we may use it. What happens to exist is the cause of its use." (De nat. rerum, IV, 833; cf. 822-56)

Classical Greek teleology

Plato summarized the argument for teleology as follows in Phaedo, arguing that it is error to fail to distinguish between the ultimate Cause, and the mere means by which the ultimate Cause acts: :"Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid. As for their capacity of being in the best place they could possibly be put, this they do not look for, nor do they believe it to have any divine force, but they believe that they will some time discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas to hold everything together more, and they do not believe that the truly good and "binding" binds and holds them together. (Plato, Phaedo 99bc) Thus, it is argued, those who attempt to explain nature in terms of nature alone are forced to deny the ultimate binding Good in the universe, and hope that they will someday discover a "stronger and more immortal Atlas" to hold their universe together. Similarly, Aristotle argued that it is error to attempt to reduce all things to mere necessity, because such thinking neglects the purpose, order, and final cause that causes the apparent necessity. He wrote: :"Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of nature. Now they are necessary, it is true, but yet they are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best in each case. Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being formed and being shed in this way; but it is not on account of these causes but on account of the end; these are causes in the sense of being the moving and efficient instruments and the material. …to say that necessity is the cause is much as if we should think that the water has been drawn off from a dropsical patient on account of the lancet alone, not on account of health, for the sake of which the lancet made the incision." Aristotle, Generation of Animals V.8, 789a8-b15

Extrinsic and intrinsic finality

Teleology depends on the concept of a final cause or purpose inherent in all beings. There are two types of such causes, intrinsic finality and extrinsic finality.
- Extrinsic finality consists of a being realizing a purpose outside the being realizing it, for the utility and welfare of other beings. For instance, minerals are "designed" to be used by plants which are in turn "designed" to be used by animals.
- Intrinsic finality consists of a being realizing a purpose by means of a natural tendency directed toward the perfection of its own nature. In essence, it is what is "good for" a being. For example, physical masses obey universal gravitational tendencies that did not evolve, but are simply a cosmic "given." Similarly, life is intended to behave in certain ways so as to preserve itself from death, disease, and pain. Over-emphasizing extrinsic finality is often criticized as leading to the anthropic attribution of every event to God's will, and mere superstition. For instance, "If I hadn't been at the store today, I wouldn't have found that $100 on the ground. God must have intended for me to go to the store so I would find that money." Such abuses were criticized by Francis Bacon ("De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum," III, iv), Descartes ("Principia Philosophiæ", I, 28; III, 2, 3; "Meditationes", III, IV), and Spinoza (Ethica, I, prop. 36 app.). Intrinsic finality, while more subtle, provides the basis for the teleological argument for the existence of God, and its modern counterpart, intelligent design. Proponents of teleology argue that it resolves a fundamental defect in philosophical naturalism. They argue that naturalism focuses exclusively on the immediate causes and mechanisms of events, and forgets to look for the reason for their synthesis. Thus, it is argued, if we take a clock apart, we discover in it nothing but springs, wheels, pivots, levers etc. But having explained the mechanism which causes the revolutions of the hands on the dial, is it reasonable to say that the clock was not made to keep time?

Teleology and modern philosophy

The area in which, within modern philosophy, teleology has had a powerful influence right through to the present has been in Hegel and the various neo-Hegelian schools, including that of Marx. In this interpretation of the history of our species on this globe - an interpretation at variance both with Darwin and with what is now called analytic philosophy - the point of departure is not so much formal logic and scientific fact but 'identity'. In Hegel's terminology: 'objective spirit'. Individual human consciousness, in the process of reaching for autonomy and freedom, has no choice but to deal with an obvious reality: the collective identities (the multiplicity of world views, ethnic, cultural and national identities) which divide the human race both now and in the past, and which set off (and always have set off) different groups of people against each other in violent conflict. Hegel conceived of the 'totality' of mutually antagonistic world-views and life-forms in history as being 'goal-driven', i.e. oriented towards an end-point in history in which the 'objective contradiction' of 'subject' and 'object' would eventually 'sublate' into a form of life which has left violent conflict behind it. This goal-oriented, 'teleological' notion of the 'historical process as a whole' is present in a variety of 20th Century authors, from Lukács to Horkheimer and Adorno.

References

- Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness. ISBN 0262620200.
- Horkheimer and Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. ISBN 0804736324.
- Herbert Marcuse. Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity. ISBN 0262132214. Category:Philosophical terminology Category:Historiography

Philosophical naturalism

Naturalism is any of several philosophical stances, typically those descended from materialism and pragmatism, that do not distinguish between the supernatural and the natural. Naturalism does not claim that phenomena or hypotheses commonly labeled as supernatural necessarily do not exist or are wrong, but insists that they are not inherently different from natural phenomena or hypotheses, and that both supernatural and natural phenomena and hypotheses can be studied by the same methods. Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining knowledge that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalistic. Distinctions are sometimes made between two approaches, the first being methodological naturalism or scientific naturalism, and the second ontological naturalism or metaphysical naturalism. This distinction between approaches to the philosophy is particularly made by those involved in the creation-evolution controversy. The first approach involves only the application of the scientific method to science, which assumes that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural. This approach is also known as scientific materialism or as methodological materialism. The second approach refers to the metaphysical assumption that the natural world is all that exists.

Methodological naturalism versus ontological naturalism

There is a distinct difference between a methodological assumption of naturalism and an ontological approach. Methodology relates to the accepted procedures. Ontology is a matter of whether something exists. Many philosophers of science define scientific investigation in a manner which limits it to studying and explaining the natural world. Naturalism of this sort says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of the supernatural. Ontological naturalism is sometimes called "metaphysical naturalism". Ontological naturalism is the view that the supernatural does not exist, whereas methodological naturalism is the more limited view that the supernatural can't be used in scientific methods. Atheism is an example of ontological naturalism concerning the existence of gods. It is possible to be a methodological naturalist and an ontological supernaturalist at the same time. While natural scientists would follow methodological naturalism, they may believe in God (ontological supernaturalism) or they may be atheist (ontological naturalism). :"Science does not produce evidence against God. Science and religion ask different questions" -- Richard Dawkins, biologist and professor of public understanding of science at Oxford University. [http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1090909,00.html] Because methodological naturalism limits science by not appealing to the supernatural, creationists, such as the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation Science website, claim that "methodological naturalism cannot be justified as a normative principle for all types of science -- without doing violence to science as a truth-seeking enterprise" [http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=94]. Others argue that excluding the supernatural from scientific methods is a form of atheism. :"methodological naturalism. It could just as well be called atheism, and is really a religion to be accepted on faith." -- Institute for Creation Research[http://www.icr.org/index.php?module=articles&action=view&ID=565] But supporters defend methodological naturalism, saying it is "effective, powerful"[http://www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html], "promoting successful investigation"[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/index.html], and "an essential aspect of ... the study of the natural universe"[http://chem.tufts.edu/AnswersInScience/MethodologicalNaturalism.htm]. They also view the history of science as showing "a progression from supernaturalism to naturalism"[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/ntse.html]. Supporters consider the creationist alternative as "positively ineffective and counter-productive, ... in attempts to understand the natural world"[http://www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html].

Naturalism as epistemology

W. V. Quine describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. There is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy", such as (abstract) metaphysics or epistemology, that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method. Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, while also feeling free to offer criticism when those claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In this way philosophy becomes "continuous with" science. Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds the processes of the universe have a scientific explanation, and those processes are what modern science is striving to understand.

Naturalism and philosophy of mind

There is currently some dispute over whether naturalism rules out certain areas of philosophy altogether, such as semantics, ethics, aesthetics, or excludes the use of mentalistic vocabulary ("believes," "thinks,") in philosophy of mind. Quine avoided most of these topics, but some recent thinkers have argued that even though (according to them) mentalistic descriptions and value judgements cannot be systematically translated into physicalistic descriptions, they also do not need to presuppose the existence of anything other than physical phenomena. Donald Davidson, for example, has argued that individual mental states can (must, in fact) be identical with individual brain states, even though a given kind of mental state (belief in Santa Claus) might not be systematically identified with a given kind of brain state (a particular pattern of neural firings): the former weakly "supervenes" upon the latter. The implication is that naturalism can leave non-physical vocabulary intact where the use of that vocabulary can be explained naturalistically; McDowell has dubbed this level of discourse "second nature."

History

The ideas and assumptions of philosophical naturalistism date to the Ionian pre-Socratic philosophers of the 4th century BCE; see, e.g., Jonathan Barnes's introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin), which describes them as subscribing to principles of empirical investigation that strikingly anticipate naturalism. During the Enlightenment, a number of philosophers including Francis Bacon and Voltaire outlined the philosophical justifications for removing appeal to supernatural forces from investigation of the natural world. Subsequent scientific revolutions would remove much of the remaining theistic baggage from scientific investigation culminating in the development of modern biology and geology which rejected the prevailing origin beliefs of the wider society's religion.

Criticism of naturalism

Critics of naturalism claim that the possibility of supernatural action is unnecessarily excluded by the current practices and theories of science. Currently, proponents of intelligent design, those who hold that certain features of the natural world are best explained as the results of intelligence, argue that the naturalist conception of reality is not needed in order to do science. The general criticism is that insisting that the natural world is a closed system of inviolable laws independent of theism or supernatural intervention will cause science to come to incorrect conclusions and inappropriately exclude research that claims to include such ideas. The debate over naturalism is alive and complex, because it concerns how narrowly or broadly nature should be defined. How open it is to what is accepted as scientific is precisely the issue that concerns just how naturalism is to be interpreted. Theism and atheism are often the two liveliest philosophies that discuss these matters in delineating the content of reality.

Neutral links

- [http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html The Craig-Taylor Debate]: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? William Lane Craig and Richard Taylor October 1993, Union College (Schenectady, New York)

Supportive links

- [http://www.naturalism.org/ naturalism.org]
- [http://www.naturalism.org/center_for_naturalism.htm Center for Naturalism]

Critical links

- [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10713a.htm Naturalism article in the Catholic Encyclopedia]
- [http://hisdefense.org/articles/ap001.html Alvin Plantinga]'s (John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at [http://www.nd.edu/ Notre Dame]) evolutionary argument against naturalism
- Victor Reppert's [http://ivpress.gospelcom.net/cgi-ivpress/book.pl/code=2732 C. S. LEWIS'S DANGEROUS IDEA: In Defense of the Argument from Reason]
- Philip Johnson's [http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/pjdogma1.htm Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism] from [http://www.firstthings.com/ First Things] Category:Ethics Category:Philosophy of science Category:Epistemology Category:Secularism

Lucretius

Titus Lucretius Carus (ca. 99 BC-55 BC) was a Roman poet and philosopher. His major work is De Rerum Natura, On the Nature of Things, which is considered by some to be the greatest masterpiece of Latin verse - deeper than any other poet; more moving, imaginative than any other philosopher. Stylistically however, most scholars attribute the full blossoming of Latin hexameter to Virgil. The De Rerum Natura however, is of indisputable importance for its influence on Virgil and other later poetry. The main purpose of the work was to free men's minds of superstition and fear of death. Creationist David Menton wrote: :Like the other Greek philosophers of his day, Lucretius attempted to satisfy a deep philosophical need for a self-assembling cosmos without a sovereign Creator. For him, evolutionary materialism was an attempt to emancipate men from two great fears -- the fear of the arbitrary interference of the gods in the affairs of men, and the fear of accountability after death.[http://www.gennet.org/facts/metro21.html] It achieves this through the principles of the philosophical system of Epicurus, whom Lucretius immortalizes. The work has several allusions to the tumultuous state of political affairs in Rome and its civil strife. Lucretius treads the steps of his teaching carefully so as not to offend traditional Romans, slowly unfolding the more controversial and revolutionary aspects of his inculcation. De Rerum Natura places more emphasis on ethical goals than did earlier Epicureans, but faithfully transmits their physics and psychology. Lucretius was the first Epicurean to write in Latin. We know very little about Lucretius' life; one source of information (generally considered unreliable) is St. Jerome, who mentions Lucretius in the Chronica Eusebia. According to Jerome, Lucretius was born in 94 BC, and died at the age of 44. He claims that Lucretius was driven mad by a love-philtre and that the work was written during the intervals of his insanity, later killing himself. These claims about Lucretius' life have been discredited for two main reasons: firstly, the Epicurean philosophy expounded by Lucretius sets great store on reason and discourages romantic attachments; and secondly, it seems likely that Jerome, as one of the early church fathers, would have wanted to discredit Lucretius's philosophy, which includes disbelief in any kind of life after death and in any divinity concerned with man's welfare. Cicero implies in one of his letters to his brother that they had once read Lucretius' poem. This is the last mention of Lucretius until Aelius Donatus, in his Life of Virgil, while stating that Virgil assumed the toga virilis on October 15, 55 BC, adds "it happened on that very day Lucretius the poet died." If Jerome is accurate about Lucretius' age (44) when he died, then based on other evidence that confirms 55 BC as Lucretius' year of death we can then conclude he was born in 99 BC. However, the only certain fact of Lucretius' life is that he was either a friend or a client of Gaius Memmius, to whom he dedicated his poem On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura). This poem is also unfinished, although Jerome says that Cicero "amended" it -- which may mean he edited it for its eventual publication. Lucretius attempts in this poem to present a total Epicurean worldview. Ranging from the nature of matter to sex, politics, and death, the poem is encyclopedic, and is considered one of the masterpieces of Latin verse. His use of the hexameter is very individualistic and ruggedly distinct from the smooth urbanity of Virgil or Ovid. His use of heterodynes, assonance, and oddly syncopated Latin forms create a harsh acoustic. The sustained energy of Lucretius' writing is unparallelled in Latin literature, with the possible exception of parts of Tacitus's Annals, or perhaps Books II and IV of the Aeneid.

External links

-
- Project Gutenberg e-text of [http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbook/lookup?num=785 On The Nature Of Things]
-
- [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1841/dr-theses/index.htm On the Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature -- Karl Marx's doctoral dissertation, 1841]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lucretius/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry]

References

- On the Nature of Things, (1951 verse translation by R. E. Latham), introduction and notes by John Godwin, Penguin revised edition 1994, ISBN 0140446109
- Lucretius (1971). De Rerum Natura Book III. (Latin version of Book III only– 37 pp., with extensive commentary by E. J. Kenney– 171 pp.), Cambridge University Press corrected reprint 1984. ISBN 0521291771 Category:Hellenistic philosophers Category:Roman era poets Category:99 BC births Category:55 BC deaths Category:Suicides ja:ルクレティウス

Phaedo

The Phaedo (pronounced FEE-doh) is the fourth and last dialogue detailing the final days of Socrates and contains the death scene. The Phaedo was written by Plato. The dialogue is told from the perspective of Phaedo of Elis, a youth who, upon Sparta's sack of Elis, had been taken prisoner and enslaved in a boy brothel. Found by Socrates, who had him bought and freed with the help of a wealthy friend, he became his close friend and student and was present at Socrates' death bed. Phaedo relates the dialogue to Echecrates, a fellow philosopher.

Immortality of the soul

One of the main themes in the Phaedo is the idea that the soul is immortal. Socrates offers four arguments for the soul's immortality:
- The Opposites Argument explains that as the Forms are eternal and unchanging, and as the soul always brings life, then it must not die, and is necessarily "imperishable". As the body is mortal and is subject to physical death, the soul must be its indestructible opposite. Plato then suggests the analogy of fire and cold. If the form of cold is imperishable, and fire, its opposite, was within close proximity, it would have to withdraw intact as does the soul during death. This could be likened to the idea of the opposite charges of magnets.
- The Theory of Recollection explains that we forget our non-empirical knowledge (e.g. The Form of Equality) at birth, and we knew such knowledge before we were born, implying the soul existed before birth. Another account of the theory is found in Plato's Meno.
- The Affinity Argument explains that invisible, immortal, and incorporeal things are different from visible, mortal, and corporeal things. Our soul is of the former, while our body is of the latter, so when our bodies die and decay, our soul will continue to live.
- The Argument from Form of Life explains that the Forms, incorporeal and static entities, are the cause of all things in the world, and all things participate in Forms. For example, beautiful things participate in the Form of Beauty; the number four participates in the Form of the Even, etc. The soul, by its very nature, participates in the Form of Life, which would mean the soul could never die.

Detailed summary

In the philosophy set forth in the Phaedo, Socrates discusses the nature of the afterlife. This dialogue is narrated to us along with Echecrates, by Plato, through Phaedo. By engaging in dialectic with two of his friends, the Thebans Cebes and Simmias, who had originally come to be with Socrates in order to assist Crito in funding his escape from prison, Socrates explores various arguments for the soul's immortality in order to show that there is an afterlife in which the soul will dwell following death. In total, Socrates presents four arguments for the immortality of the soul. The first three, though convincing, are insubstantial. These may be referred to as the cyclical, recollective, and affinity arguments. While valuable to the reader as examples of both invalid arguments and the difficulty of proving such a claim as the soul's immortality, none of the first three are sufficient either on their own or combined to satisfy either the two Thebans or the reader. The fourth argument, however, is accepted by Socrates' interlocutors as being logically sound. Socrates seems to have proven the immortality of the soul for the reason that the cause of life can never be dead. There is no possibility for a dead soul, and hence the soul is immortal. Neither of his interlocutors can find any reason to object. However, while the argument is in fact valid, it may still be criticized as unsound, for it is based upon a premise that has yet to be conclusively shown to be true. However, as Socrates and those present during the final hours of his life accept the argument, we may continue our investigation of the Socratic notion of the afterlife provided that we suspend disbelief. In so doing, we will see in whose company the soul will be following its passage to the underworld. For, Socrates holds that the soul of the philosopher will be treated blessedly by the gods once he has died and that it will be possible to converse with great men of history. Further objections may here be raised, and we will see that Socrates asserts theories enough to show conclusively what the afterlife will really be like. And so while Socrates' efforts to withstand criticism may not have been wholly successful, to investigate his conception of both the immortality of the soul and the afterlife in general, one may come to a greater understanding of the problems therein and see why the philosopher is justified in living his way of life. Following introductory remarks and the removal of Socrates' wife Xanthippe, the Phaedo begins with Cebes questioning Socrates about various issues. The first question is raised on behalf of Evenus, a Sophist. Cebes asks on his behalf, why Socrates, "who never before wrote a line of poetry," is now in prison "turning Aesop's fables into verse" and also composing a hymn in honor of Apollo (Phaedo, 60d). Socrates answers that he is doing so in order to satisfy intimations received during his dreams that he should make music (60d-e). Attributing this sudden interest to a desire to part from the world having obeyed the divination that he often received while dreaming, that he should make music, Socrates justifies himself. Following this explanation, Socrates tells Phaedo to "bid him farewell from me; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man" (Phaedo, 61b). Simmias expresses confusion as to why Evenus ought hasten to follow Socrates to death. Socrates, then, states that, "...he, who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die; but he will not take his own life." (Phaedo, 61c) To this statement, Cebes then raises his doubts as to why suicide is prohibited. Cebes first asks why the philosopher should not kill himself. Socrates replies that while death is the ideal home of the soul, man, specifically the philosopher, should not commit suicide except when it becomes necessary. He asks, "Why do you say…that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow one who is dying?" (Phaedo, 61d). Following this, a discussion about suicide occurs between Cebes and Socrates, in which the latter succeeds in showing the former that one ought not to hasten towards death through suicide. While the philosopher seeks always to rid himself of the body, and to focus solely on things concerning the soul, to commit suicide is prohibited as man is not sole possessor of his body. For, as stated in the Phaedo: "the philosopher more than other men frees the soul from association with the body as much as possible" (64e-65a). Body and soul are separate, then. The philosopher frees himself from the body because the body is an impediment to the attainment of truth. The philosopher acts as such in order that the body will not distract the soul from attaining virtue and knowledge. For, while the body is incapable of distinctly perceiving truth about anything, the pursuit of truth is the philosopher's task. During the Apology, Socrates says of this task, "God orders me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men." (Apology, 28e-29a) Of the senses failings, Socrates says to Simmias in the Phaedo:

"Did you ever reach them with any bodily sense? -- and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and, in short, of the reality or true nature of everything. Is the truth of them ever perceived through the bodily organs? Or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing he considers?" (Phaedo, 65d-e)

The philosopher, then, will accept that he can come closest to true knowledge in death for he will no longer be distracted by the body. As the philosopher seeks death his entire life, he should greet it amicably and not be discouraged upon its arrival. However, it is impossible to be alive without the existence of the body. Death, then, the separation of body and soul, is the philosopher's ideal. He will have lived his entire life preparing for and hoping for death. And, so, while, as Socrates best discusses in the Apology, no living man, be he a poet, sophist, or even Socrates himself, is capable of really knowing anything, the philosopher will see death as a haven for the soul. In death only, the soul may possibly come to actually gain true knowledge. For:

"He who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements when they associate with the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge--who, if not he, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true being?" (Apology, 65e-66a)

However, man should not kill himself. Socrates cites the traditional argument that man ought not to kill himself because he possesses no actual ownership of himself, as he is actually the property of the gods. He says, "I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a chattel of theirs" (Phaedo, 62b). To this, Cebes assents. For, the body is the property of the gods, and man would be punished were he to destroy something that he does not truly own. Then, it may be concluded that man should not kill himself because he will be punished by the gods. The philosopher, then, will greet death, but not hasten to its arrival. For, while he has spent his life preparing for and awaiting its arrival, it is not virtuous to bring about its occurrence. Two points are evident from this discussion. First, that the body and soul are held to be separate entities, and that they may be separated, most thoroughly through death. Secondly, in arguing that one ought not to do harm to the possession of the gods, it may be inferred that Socrates believes in an afterlife. For, where else would the gods seek retribution and inflict punishment on the person who acts immorally by committing suicide than in some afterlife? Indeed the only thing worrying Socrates in the moments before his death is his duty to the gods. He is concerned that certain things be taken care of in order to provide for a swift and blessed journey to the underworld. And so, he has taken to composing music and will later remind Crito to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius, god of medicine and healing (Phaedo, 118a). Socrates then believes that though the soul is immortal, man must perform certain actions and live in a certain manner in order to ensure that the gods treat its immortality favorably once he has died. The argument continues that man's soul is immortal, and thus may be punished in some way by the gods even after the separation of soul and body. In the course of this argument, the notion of the afterlife arises, and Socrates treats it in multiple ways, always seeking to show that the soul is immortal. He does so by first formulating cyclical, recollective, and affinity arguments. However, we must first see what death is. Indeed, the first concept needing elucidation in order to speak of an afterlife is the nature of death. It must first be shown that Socrates believes death to be one of two things. The first he discusses in both the Apology and the Phaedo. The second is mentioned only in the Apology. Either, "that the body comes to be separated by itself apart from the soul, and the soul comes to be separated by itself apart from the body" (Phaedo, 64c), or it is the complete dissolution of the soul. Cebes is troubled by the latter. He worries that death might signify the complete annihilation of the soul. Cebes speaks of such a view and the men who hold it:

"...they fear that when she [the soul] has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end immediately on her release from the body...dispersing and vanishing away into nothingness in her flight." (Phaedo, 70a)

We have two Socratic critiques of this idea. In the Apology, Socrates shows that were the soul to dissipate into nothingness upon death, this would be a great blessing to man. He says that, if, "...death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness," then it is "an unspeakable gain." (Apology, 40c) Socrates goes on to illustrate this claim by saying that if death is of such a nature, then it resembles and even exceeds the most peaceful, dreamless night of sleep ever passed by man during his life. As most men would be hard pressed to come up with a more serene time in their lives, either awake or asleep, than those nights unperturbed by even dreams, then to be so for eternity would be a true blessing (Apology, 40c-d). However, in the Phaedo, Socrates refutes the idea altogether. He does so by showing that the soul continues to exist after death and is immortal. Socrates also refers to such worries about the dispersion of the soul as being childish (Phaedo, 77d). In order to alleviate Cebes' worry that the soul might perish at death, Socrates introduces his first argument for the immortality of the soul. This argument is called the cyclical argument. It supposes that the soul must be immortal since the living come from the dead. Socrates first lays out the argument. He says: "Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again?" (Phaedo, 70c-d). He goes on to show, using examples of relationships, such as asleep-awake and hot-cold, that things that have opposites come to be from their opposite. One falls asleep after having been awake. And after being asleep, he awakens. Things that are hot can become cold and vice versa. Socrates then gets Cebes to conclude that the dead are generated from the living, through death, and that the living are generated from the dead, through birth. The souls of the dead must exist in some place, then, for them to be able to return into life. This argument does not necessarily hold, however. It does not show that the soul continues to exist once a man has died. However, neither Cebes nor Simmias object to the argument. Rather, Cebes realizes the relationship between the cyclical existence argument and Socrates' theory of recollection. He interrupts Socrates to point this out, saying:

"...your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that our learning is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been somewhere before existing in this form of man; here then is another proof of the soul's immortality." (Phaedo, 72e-73a)

The theory of recollection runs basically that as it has been shown that it is possible to draw a true answer out of a person who seems to not have any knowledge of the subject prior to his questioning, this person must have gained this knowledge in a prior life, and now merely recalls it. Indeed, as he has now been able to answer correctly, it must be the case that his answer arose from recollection of knowledge gained during a previous life. Socrates presents this argument to Meno in the Platonic dialogue of the same name. In it, he concludes, "The soul, then, as being immortal and having been born again many times and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all." He continues to state emphatically that "all inquiry and all learning is but recollection" (Meno, 81d). The argument is then illustrated by Socrates' implementation of the elenchus to draw out geometric truths from one of Meno's slave boys. While this argument is sufficient to show that the soul has existed before, and so acquired what is now a priori knowledge, it does not necessarily prove that the soul will exist forever. For, while the soul may have lived any number of lives prior to the one in question that does not necessarily mean that it will continue to exist following its subsequent death(s). Knowledge then must have been attained sometime prior to birth. To infer as much through induction is invalid. Socrates has not shown that the soul is immortal by means of a recollection argument. The soul, though having existed prior to birth, may still dissolve at death. Cebes doubts that Socrates has shown the soul to be immortal. And so, Socrates presents his third argument for the immortality of the soul. In this, the so-called affinity argument, Socrates shows that the soul most resembles that which is invisible and divine, and the body that which is visible and mortal. From this, it is concluded that while the body may be seen to exist after death in the form of a corpse, as the body is the mortal of the two and the soul is the more divine, the soul must outlast the body. There is reason to be skeptical about this argument. But, as Simmias admits, not wishing to disturb Socrates during his final hours by unsettling his belief in the immortality of the soul, those present are reluctant to voice their skepticism. Socrates grows aware of their doubt and assures his interlocutors that he does indeed believe in the soul's immortality, regardless of whether or not he has succeeded in showing it as yet (Phaedo, 84d). For this reason, he is not upset facing death and assures them that they ought to express their concerns regarding the arguments. Following Socrates' assurance that he will not be caused any pain as a result of any objections, Simmias presents his case that it may be such that the soul resembles the harmony of the lyre. It may be, then, that as the soul resembles the harmony in its being invisible and divine, and once the lyre has been destroyed, the harmony too vanishes, that once the body dies, the soul too vanishes. And, while the pieces of the broken lyre may be seen to continue to exist as one's mortal remains, as the harmony will have dissipated, we may infer that so too will the soul dissipate once the body has been broken, through death (Phaedo, 85e-86d). Socrates pauses, and asks Cebes to voice his objection as well (Phaedo, 86d-e). Cebes then points the aforementioned contradiction out. He says, "I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been…proven; but the existence of the soul after death is in my judgment unproven." (Phaedo, 87a) While admitting that the soul is the better part of a man, and the body the weaker, Cebes is not ready to infer then that since the body may be perceived as existing after death, that the soul must therefore continue to exist as well. Cebes appeals to the example of the weaver (Phaedo, 86e-88b). For, while the weaver's cloaks may be seen as either existing following his death or perishing prior to it, for he has made many, it does not necessarily follow that the greater (the weaver/soul) will necessarily outlast the weaker (the cloak/body). Cebes would then, "...rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death." (Phaedo, 87e-88a) Cebes continues that though the soul may outlast certain bodies, and so continue to exist after certain deaths, it may eventually grow so weak as to dissolve entirely at some point. He then concludes that the soul's immortality has yet to be shown and that we may still doubt the soul's existence after death. For, it may be that the next death is the one under which the soul ultimately collapses and exists no more (Phaedo, 88b). Insofar as both Phaedo and Socrates pause in the course of their discussions at this point, we may see that the recollection argument has failed to show the immortality of the soul. Phaedo then remarks to Echecrates, pausing in the course of his hitherto uninterrupted account of Socrates' final hours and his arguments for the immortality of the soul, saying that, because of this objection, those present had their "faith shaken," and that their was introduced "a confusion and uncertainty" (Phaedo, 88c). Socrates too pauses following this objection and then warns against misology, the hatred of argument (Phaedo, 89d). From here, Socrates continues to give his final proof of the immortality of the soul. This last one is accepted by those present as irrefutable and is indeed logically valid. The only objection one may raise is that it is based upon a premise that is not necessarily true, and so is not a sound argument. By appealing to the idea of Forms, Socrates shows that the soul is immortal as it is the cause of life. He begins by showing that "if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty it is beautiful only in so far as it partakes of absolute beauty" (Phaedo, 100c). Consequently, as absolute beauty is a Form, and so is the soul, then anything which has the property of being infused with a soul is so infused with the Form of soul. "Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?" (Phaedo, 104c). Forms, then, will never become their opposite. As the soul is that which renders the body living, and that the opposite of life is death, it so follows that, "...the soul will never admit the opposite of what she always brings." (Phaedo, 105d) That which does not admit death is said to be immortal. The soul does not become dead as the even does not become odd. Therefore, the soul is immortal. For, it is exactly that which does not die. Socrates thus concludes, "Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world." (Phaedo, 106d-107a) Now, as this final argument rests on the assumption that the soul is that which causes life, there are certain objections that may yet be made. To this, we may give one caveat before progressing to see what exactly the afterlife may be. However, insofar as it is the aim of this investigation to see how Socrates conceives of the afterlife, it is not necessary to attempt a refutation of this final argument. For, it has been shown through the course of successive arguments, objections, and clarifications in the forms of subsequent arguments that Socrates conceives of the afterlife in such and such a way. To see how Socrates so conceives of the afterlife is the goal of this investigation, and so we may now go on to see just what the nature of the afterlife is. Following the apparent proof that the soul is immortal, it yet remains to see how exactly the soul will exist following death. We have seen that Socrates has no doubt that the soul is immortal. He also holds that the philosopher is most likely to obtain truth in the underworld, during the afterlife. True knowledge is only capable of being attained there because death will release the soul from the body's influence and remove all corporeal distractions. Once dead, man's soul will go to Hades and be in the company of, as Socrates says, "...men departed, better than those whom I leave behind." (Phaedo, 63c) For he will dwell amongst those who were true philosophers, like himself. In the Apology, Socrates says: "But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below." What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Usaeus and Hesiod and Homer? "For besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is said is true." (Apology, 40c-41c) While Socrates hopes to converse with these great men of history, the possibility that these men will not be in the underworld, as their souls may already have transmigrated back to the world of the living never seems to arise. If we assume Socrates' belief in the theory of recollection, then these men who have already died within recorded history may also have already returned to the world of the living. For, while not necessarily contradictory with the above quote, as indeed all the dead will necessarily abide in the underworld, it has not been shown that those who have already died will yet remain in Hades. However, Socrates' idea that those who are truly virtuous during life will be eternally free from the body once dead allows us to dogmatically assert that the philosopher, once dead, will be forever immortal. As to be truly virtuous during life is the quality of a great man, then each of the men mentioned above, insofar as they are great, will perpetually dwell as souls in the underworld. However, regarding those who were not virtuous during life, and so favored the body and pleasures pertaining exclusively to it, Socrates also speaks. For those that were not great during life, however, once dead, the swift return to the world of the living is assured. For, these people will not have succeeded in freeing their soul from their body while alive. Of those souls that are not free, Socrates speaks. He says that such a one as this is:

"...polluted, is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always and is in love with and bewitched by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see, and drink and eat, and use for the purposes of his lusts, the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, but is the object of mind and can be attained by philosophy; do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?" (Phaedo, 81b)

Persons of such a constitution will be dragged back into corporeal life, according to Socrates. These persons will even be punished while in Hades. Their punishment will be their own doing, as they will be unable to enjoy the singular existence of the soul in death because of their constant craving for life. For, these are the souls "...of the evil, which are compelled to -- in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life...until...they are imprisoned finally in another body" (Phaedo, 81d-e). The soul is immortal and the course of its passing into the underworld is determined by the way in which it last behaved while alive. The philosopher then, and indeed any man similarly virtuous, in neither fearing death, nor cherishing corporeal life as something idyllic, will be eternally unperturbed in death, and his afterlife will be perfect. For this reason, the philosopher practices the disengagement from the soul during life, in order to attain the virtue that will provide him with eternal reward, while not committing suicide, as argued above. Such is the nature of the afterlife as espoused by Socrates in Plato's Phaedo.

Last Days of Socrates

The Phaedo is the fourth book of the series detailing Socrates' trial and final hours, the first three being Euthyphro, Crito, and Apology. Phaedo ja:パイドン

Final cause

Purpose is deliberately thought-through goal-directedness. According to some philosophies, purpose is central to a good human life. Helen Keller wrote that happiness comes from "fidelity to a worthy purpose", and Ayn Rand wrote that purpose must be one of the three ruling values of human life (the others are reason and self-esteem). Some people think that God assigns purposes to people and that it is their mission to fulfill them. Others say that purpose is not inherent, but instead freely chosen (or not chosen) by individuals. Among these, some say that natural propensities may determine what sorts of purposes a person needs to pursue, but do not guarantee that he or she will pursue them, that being dependent on free choice. Pursuing a career, raising a family, devotion to a creative vocation, and acquiring property are perhaps the most widespread of long-term purposes that make life meaningful according to such philosophies. Public service and helping the needy are often cited. Variants of philosophies such as eudaimonia and objectivism sometimes claim that self-sacrificial goals are destructive. Purpose is similar to teleology, the idea that a final goal is implicit in all living organisms. Until the modern age, philosophy followed Aristotle's depiction of a teleological cosmos in which all things had a final purpose, (namely, to realize their implicit perfection). Perhaps most modern philosophers of science have reversed the idea of purpose inherent in nature; they do not consider an eye explicable as being "in order to see"; instead, cause-and-effect processes are credited with bringing about the eye organ, which allows us to see. The difference is between a cause as pushing from behind (movements of billiard balls) and a cause as pulling from within (movement of a growing plant). With teleology (purpose) matter is fulfilling some aim from within.

External links

- [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-42 Dictionary of the History of Ideas:] Causation in the Seventeenth Century: Final Causes Category:Philosophical terminology Category:Personal life simple:Purpose

Intrinsic finality

Intrinsic finality is the idea that there is a natural good for all beings, and that all beings have a natural tendency to pursue their own good. It is an underlying principle of teleology, and moral objectivism. The concept of intrinsic finality was summarized by Thomas Aquinas (in Contra Gentiles, IV, xix) as follows. :By the form which gives it its specific perfection, everything in nature has an inclination to its own operations and to its own end, which it reaches through these operations. Just as everything is, such also are its operations and its tendency to what is suitable to itself. The idea of intrinsic finality presumes that there is an objective reality, and that there is an natural order or natural law in the universe. In essence, things are "supposed" to be and behave a certain way, and naturally tend to act that way. For instance, animals have natural instincts for self-preservation, seeking food, food, and reproduction. Similarly, objects in space naturally follow the laws of gravitation. These objects do not do so randomly. They do so because it is their nature to do so. Theologians go further, to argue that they do so because they were created to do so. The existence of such a finality is often challenged, particularly by philosophers ascribing to philosophical naturalism. They argue that it is unreasonable to say that all beings naturally pursue their own benefit, when some beings clearly do not. They point to instances of imperfection, disease, and death as evidence that natural beings do not naturally move toward perfection. Proponents of intrinsic finalilty respond that the existence of imperfections does not disprove the existence of intrinsic finality, but rather that the recognition of imperfection requires the recognition of a standard of the perfect end from which the being in question falls short. In answer to the question of why beings fall short of their perfection, proponents of moral objectivism propose a number of answers, including improper education, sin, or predestination. Category:Theology Category:Teleology

Anthropic principle

In cosmology, the anthropic principle in its most basic form states the truism that any valid theory of the universe must be consistent with our existence as carbon-based human beings at this particular time and place in the universe. In other words, "If something must be true for us, as humans, to exist; then it is true simply because we exist." Attempts to apply this principle to develop scientific explanations in cosmology have led to some confusion and much controversy.

Origin

The term "anthropic principle" was first proposed in 1973 by theoretical physicist Brandon Carter during the symposium "Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data" in Kraków celebrating Copernicus’ 500th birthday, as if to proclaim that humanity does hold a special place in the universe after all. In his contribution "Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology" Carter remarks: "Although our situation is not necessarily central, it is inevitably privileged to some extent" (IAUS 63 (1974) 291).

Proponents and versions

Proponents of the anthropic principle suggest that we live in a fine-tuned universe, i.e. a universe that appears to be "fine-tuned" to allow the existence of life as we know it. If any of the basic physical constants were significantly different, then life as we know it would not be possible. Papers have been written arguing that the anthropic principle would explain the physical constants such as the fine structure constant, the number of dimensions in the universe, and the cosmological constant. The three primary versions of the principle, as stated by John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler (1986), are:
- Weak anthropic principle (WAP): "The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirements that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so."
- Strong anthropic principle (SAP): "The Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage in its history."
- Final anthropic principle (FAP): "Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out." The weak version has been criticized as an argument by lack of imagination for assuming no other forms of life are possible (see also alternative biochemistry). Furthermore, the range of constants allowing evolution of carbon-based life may be much less restricted than proposed (Stenger, "Timeless Reality"). The strong version is also criticized as being neither testable nor falsifiable, and unnecessary. The final version is discussed in more detail under final anthropic principle; Barrow and Tipler state that, although it is a physical statement, it is nevertheless "closely connected with moral values". Proponents of intelligent design assert support from the anthropic principle. On the other hand, the existence of alternate universes is suggested for other reasons and the anthropic principle provides additional support for their existence. Assuming some possible universe would be capable of supporting intelligent life, some actual universes must do so, and ours clearly is one of those. However, alternatives of the intelligent design conjecture are not limited to proposing the existence of alternate universes. Also, [http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/anthropic.html it has been argued] that the anthropic principle as conventionally stated actually undermines the intelligent design conjecture (discussed in more detail under fine tuning). In other words, proponents of evolution also assert support from the anthropic principle.

The Anthropic Cosmological Principle

In 1986, the controversial book The Anthropic Cosmological Principle by John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler (Oxford University Press) was published. In this book Barrow, a cosmological scientist, and Tipler, a mathematical physicist, pioneered the anthropic principle in order to deal with the seemingly incredible coincidences that allow for our presence in a universe that appears to be perfectly set up for our existence. Everything from the particular energy state of the electron to the exact level of the weak nuclear force seems to be tailored for us to exist. The existence of carbon-based life in this universe is contingent upon several independent variables; and were any of these variables to take a slightly different value, carbon-based life could not exist. The anthropic principle implies that our ability to ponder cosmology at all is contingent on all the correct variables being in place. According to critics, this is simply a tautology, a very elaborate way of saying 'if things were different, they would be different'. This weak anthropic principle is a truism that says nothing and explains nothing because in order for us to be here to ponder the universe, it had to be such that we can exist. Brandon Carter presented his ideas about the anthropic principle in a 1974 publication of the International Astronomical Union. Later, in 1983, he claimed that, in its original form, the principle was meant only to caution astrophysicists and cosmologists of possible errors in the interpretation of astronomical and cosmological data unless the biological constraints of the observer were taken into account. In 1983 he also included the warning that the inverse was true for evolutionary biologists; Carter claimed that in interpreting the evolutionary record, one must take into account the astrophysical restraints of the process. Working with this in mind, Carter concluded that the evolutionary chain probably could include only one or two highly improbable links given the available time interval. A. Feoli and S. Rampone ("Is the Strong Anthropic Principle Too Weak," 1999) argued that the estimated size of our universe and number of planets allows a higher bound, indicating no evidence for intelligent design in evolution. There was renewed scientific interest in the anthropic principle in the late-1990s motivated by observational cosmology and theoretical work in quantum gravity. The theoretical work involved attempting to unify gravity with the other forces. While there were a number of promising developments, they all seemed to suffer from the problem that the fundamental physical constants seemed to be unconstrained. The observational motivation came from cosmological observations which gave firm values for quantities such as the matter density of the universe. Contrary to expectations, the value was not one, but 0.3, which is a non-obvious value. Recent publications (2004) by Stephen Hawking suggest that our universe is much less 'special' than the proponents of the anthropic principle claim it is. According to Hawking, there is a 98% chance that a universe of a type as ours will come from a Big Bang. Further, using the basic wavefunction of the universe as basis, Hawking's equations indicate that such a universe can come into existence without relation to anything prior to it, meaning that it could come out of nothing. As of 2004, however, these publications and the theories in them are still subject to scientific debate, and in the past, Hawking himself has asked, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?...Why does the universe go to all the bother of existing?" (Hawking, 1988).

Anthropic principle in string theory

String theory predicts a large number of possible universes, called the backgrounds or vacua. The set of these of vacua is often called the anthropic landscape or simply the landscape. Some physicists, e.g. Leonard Susskind, argue that the existence of a large number of vacua puts the anthropic reasoning on firm ground. Others, most notably Peter Woit and Lubos Motl argue that this is not predictive. M-theory attempts to deal with this problem.

Anthropic bias and anthropic reasoning

In 2002, Nick Bostrom asked "Is it possible to sum up the essence of observation selection effects in a simple statement?" He concluded that it might be, but that: :Many 'anthropic principles' are simply confused. Some, especially those drawing inspiration from Brandon Carter's seminal papers, are sound, but... they are too weak to do any real scientific work. In particular, I argue that existing methodology does not permit any observational consequences to be derived from contemporary cosmological theories, in spite of the fact that these theories quite plainly can be and are being tested empirically by astronomers. What is needed to bridge this methodological gap is a more adequate formulation of how observation selection effects are to be taken into account. His Self-Sampling Assumption is "that you should think of yourself as if you were a random observer from a suitable reference class." This he expands into a model of anthropic bias and anthropic reasoning under the uncertainty introduced by not knowing your place in our universe - or even who "we" are. This may also be a way to overcome various cognitive bias limits inherent in the humans doing the observation and sharing models of our universe using mathematics, as suggested in the cognitive science of mathematics. There is a recent paper by Steve Weinberg which endorses anthropic principle.

References

External links

-
- [http://arXiv.org/find/astro-ph/1/OR+ti:+AND+anthropic+principle+abs:+AND+anthropic+principle/0/1/0/all/0/1 debate among scientists on arxiv.org]
- Anthropic Reasoning, Stephen Hawking [http://www.phys.cwru.edu/events/cerca_video_archive.php Kavli-CERCA Conference Video Archive]
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- [http://www.epicidiot.com/evo_cre/13cards.htm Evolutionary Probability and Fine Tuning]
- [http://www.epicidiot.com/evo_cre/vr_privileged_planet.htm Critical review of "The Privileged Planet"]

Footnote

The principle had, however, been invoked before then, e.g. in 1957, R.H. Dicke wrote: 'The age of the Universe "now" is not random but conditioned by biological factors ... [changes in the values of the fundamental constants of physics] would preclude the existence of man to consider the problem.' (R.H. Dicke, Principle of Equivalence and Weak Interactions, Rev.Mod.Phys. 29, 355 (1957).) Even earlier statements of the principle may be found in Alfred Russel Wallace's book Man's Place in the Universe, which was first published in 1903. For example: "such a vast and complex universe as that which we know exists around us, may have been absolutely required ... in order to produce a world that should be precisely adapted in every detail for the orderly development of life culminating in man." (pp. 256-7 in the 1912 edition). It also has analogs in, e.g., Karl Marx's theory of historical materialism: "The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature." (The German Ideology, [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#a2 ch. 1]) Category:Cosmology Anthropic Cosmological Principle, The

Superstition

:For other senses, see superstition (disambiguation). A superstition is an irrational or invalid belief about the relation between certain actions (often behaviors) and other actions that is not true. The essence of superstition is not defined by the "truth" of the result, however, but recognized by the methods through which truth is searched for. The superstitious individual erroneously believes that the future, or the outcome of certain events can be caused or influenced by certain specified behaviors, despite the lack of a causal relationship in reality. Many superstitions emerged from the notions of "good luck" and "bad luck"; the notion of "luck", however, can itself be considered a form of superstition. Some popular superstitions are a result of misinterpreting correlations as causes, although many others are simply urban legends that have no rational justification whatsoever. Many things that were once considered scientific are now considered superstitious such as alchemy or astrology By its definition superstition is not based on reason and is not true. Many superstitions can be prompted by misunderstandings of causality or statistics. Others spring from unenlightened fears, which may be expressed in religious beliefs or practice, or to belief in extraordinary events, supernatural interventions, apparitions or in the efficacy of charms, incantations, the meaningfulness of omens and prognostications. Any of the above can lead to unfounded fears, or excessive scrupulosity in outward observances. Fanaticism, some argue, (citation needed) arises from this same displaced religious feeling, in a state of high-wrought and self-confident excitement. Such unquestioning loyalty can apply to politics and ideologies as well as religion; indeed, it can even be focused on sports teams and celebrities. See Baseball superstition for a series of such examples. Examples of superstitions include things like a gambler crediting a winning streak in poker to a "lucky rabbit's foot" or to sitting in a certain chair, rather than to skill or to the law of averages. An airline passenger might believe that it is a medal of St Christopher (traditional patron saint of travellers) that keeps him safe in the air, rather than the fact that airplanes statistically crash very rarely. Brides on their wedding day do not usually see their groom until the ceremony believing that to do so causes bad luck. Superstition is also used to refer to folkloric belief systems, usually as juxtaposed to another religion's idea of the spiritual world, or as juxtaposed to science. In the academic discipline of folkloristics the term "superstition" is used to denote any folk belief expressed in if/then (with an optional "unless" clause) format. IF you break a mirror, THEN you will have seven years of bad luck UNLESS you throw all of the pieces into a body of running water.

Superstition and behavioral psychology

The behaviorist psychologist B.F. Skinner placed a series of hungry pigeons in a cage attached to an automatic mechanism that delivered food to the pigeon "at regular intervals with no reference whatsoever to the bird's behavior". He discovered that the pigeons associated the delivery of the food with whatever chance actions they had been performing as it was delivered, and that they continued to perform the same actions: :One bird was conditioned to turn counter-clockwise about the cage, making two or three turns between reinforcements. Another repeatedly thrust its head into one of the upper corners of the cage. A third developed a 'tossing' response, as if placing its head beneath an invisible bar and lifting it repeatedly. Two birds developed a pendulum motion of the head and body, in which the head was extended forward and swung from right to left with a sharp movement followed by a somewhat slower return. ("'Superstition' in the Pigeon", B.F. Skinner, Journal of Experimental Psychology #38, 1947 [http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Skinner/Pigeon/]) Skinner suggested that the pigeons believed that they were influencing the automatic mechanism with their "rituals" and that the experiment also shed light on human behavior: :The experiment might be said to demonstrate a sort of superstition. The bird behaves as if there were a causal relation between its behavior and the presentation of food, although such a relation is lacking. There are many analogies in human behavior. Rituals for changing one's luck at cards are good examples. A few accidental connections between a ritual and favorable consequences suffice to set up and maintain the behavior in spite of many unreinforced instances. The bowler who has released a ball down the alley but continues to behave as if she were controlling it by twisting and turning her arm and shoulder is another case in point. These behaviors have, of course, no real effect upon one's luck or upon a ball half way down an alley, just as in the present case the food would appear as often if the pigeon did nothing -- or, more strictly speaking, did something else. (Ibid.) Like the pigeons, many people associate behavior (head-turning or worship of God(s) ) with an external phenomenon (delivery of food or conquest by a foreign power) that was not necessarily connected in any way with personal behavior. Any misfortune could thus be interpreted as a sign of divine disfavor, whether or not the individuals who suffered bore direct responsibility.

Religious views on the subject of superstition

Superstition may be expressed in the terminology of religion, giving rise to skeptical thinkers' opinion that all religion is superstition. Greek and Roman pagans, who modeled their relations with the gods on political and social terms scorned the man who constantly trembled with fear at the thought of the gods, as a slave feared a cruel and capricious master. "Such fear of the gods (deisidaimonia) was what the Romans meant by 'superstition' (Veyne 1987, p 211). For Christians just such fears might be worn proudly as a name: Desdemona. The Roman Catholic Church considers superstition to be sinful in the sense that it denotes a lack of trust in the divine providence of God and, as such, is a violation of the first of the Ten Commandments. The Catechism of the Catholic Church states superstition "in some sense represents a perverse excess of religion" (para. #2110). The Catechism even appears to turn a bit of a critical eye on Catholic doctrine whenever certain practices become frivolous or scrupulous: :Superstition is a deviation of religious feeling and of the practices this feeling imposes. It can even affect the worship we offer the true God, e.g., when one attributes an importance in some way magical to certain practices otherwise lawful or necessary. To attribute the efficacy of prayers or of sacramental signs to their mere external performance, apart from the interior dispositions that they demand is to fall into superstition. Cf. Matthew 23:16-22 (para. #2111) Atheists and Agnostics often see all Religious belief as a form of superstition, and religious believers have seen other religions as superstition. Edmund Burke, the great Irish orator, once said, "Superstition is the religion of weak minds".

External links

- [http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/robert_ingersoll/superstition.html Superstition] by Robert Green Ingersoll
- [http://www.geocities.com/vaksam/supers.html The Science of Superstitions] by Dr. Sam Vaknin
- [http://skepdic.com/ The Skeptic's Dictionary]: A very handy and comprehensive online reference on all matters paranormal or dubious.
- [http://www.infidels.org/desk.html The Secular Web Reference Desk]
- [http://www.nobeliefs.com/problemswithbeliefs.htm Problems with beliefs]: These articles examine beliefs, faiths and superstitions to help become aware of their methodology and dangerous consequences.

Source

- Veyne, Paul. 1987 A History of Private Life: 1. From Pagan Rome to Byzantium. category:cognitive biases ko:미신 ja:迷信 th:ความเชื่อโชคลาง

Francis Bacon

Francis Bacon, 1st Viscount St Albans, KC (22 January 1561 – 9 April 1626) was an English philosopher, statesman, spy, freemason and essayist. He was knighted in 1603, created Baron Verulam in 1618, and created Viscount St Albans in 1621; both peerage titles becoming extinct upon his death. He began his professional life as a lawyer, but he has become best known as a philosophical advocate and defender of the scientific revolution. His works establish and popularize an inductive methodology for scientific inquiry, often called the Baconian method. Induction implies drawing knowledge from the natural world through experimentation, observation, and testing of hypotheses. In the context of his time, such methods were connected with the occult trends of hermeticism and alchemy.

Early life

Francis Bacon was born at York House Strand, London. He was the youngest of five sons of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal under Elizabeth I. His mother, Ann Cooke Bacon was the second wife of Sir Nicholas, a member of the Reformed or Puritan Church, and a daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, whose sister married William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the great minister of Queen Elizabeth. Biographers believe that Bacon received an education at home in his early years, and that his health during that time, as later, was delicate. He entered Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1573 at the age of 12, living for three years there with his older brother Anthony Bacon. At Cambridge he first met the Queen, who was impressed by his precocious intellect, and was accustomed to call him "the young Lord Keeper." Here also his studies of science brought him to the conclusion that the methods (and thus the results) were erroneous. His reverence for Aristotle conflicted with his dislike of Aristotelian philosophy, which seemed barren, disputatious, and wrong in its objectives. On June 27, 1576, he and Anthony were entered de societate magistrorum at Gray's Inn, and a few months later they went abroad with Sir Amias Paulet, the English ambassador at Paris. The disturbed state of government and society in France under Henry III afforded him valuable political instruction. The sudden death of his father in February 1579 necessitated Bacon's return to England, and seriously influenced his fortunes. Sir Nicholas had laid up a considerable sum of money to purchase an estate for his youngest son, but he died before doing so, and Francis was left with only a fifth of that money. Having started with insufficient means, he borrowed money and became habitually in debt. To support himself, he took up his residence in law at Gray's Inn in 1579.

Career

Gray's Inn In the fragment De Interpretatione Naturae Prooemium (written probably about 1603) Bacon analyses his own mental character and establishes his goals, which were threefold: discovery of truth, service to his country, and service to the church. Knowing that a prestigious post would aid him toward these ends, in 1580 he applied, through his uncle, Lord Burghley, for some post at court which might enable him to devote himself to a life of learning. His application failed, and for the next two years he worked quietly at Gray's Inn giving himself seriously to the study of law, until admitted as an outer barrister in 1582. In 1584 he took his seat in parliament for Melcombe in Dorset, and subsequently for Taunton (1586). He wrote on the condition of parties in the church, and he set down his thoughts on philosophical reform in the lost tract, Temporis Partus Maximus, but he failed to obtain a position of the kind he thought necessary for success. In the Parliament of 1586 he took a prominent part in urging the execution of Mary Queen of Scots. About this time he seems again to have approached his powerful uncle, the result of which may possibly be traced in his rapid progress at the Bar, and in his receiving, in 1589, the reversion to the Clerkship of the Star Chamber, a valuable appointment, the enjoyment of which, however, he did not enter into until 1608. During this period Bacon became acquainted with Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex (1567-1601), Queen Elizabeth's favourite. By 1591 he was acting as the earl's confidential adviser. Bacon took his seat for Middlesex when in February 1593 Elizabeth called a Parliament to investigate a Catholic plot against her. His opposition to a bill that would levy triple subsidies in half the usual time (he objected to the time span) offended many people; he was accused of seeking popularity, and was for a time excluded from the court. When the Attorney-Generalship fell vacant in 1594 and Bacon became a candidate for the office, Lord Essex's influence could not secure him the position; in fashion, Bacon failed to become solicitor in 1595. To console him for these disappointments Essex presented him with a property at Twickenham, which he subsequently sold for £1800, equivalent to a much larger sum now. 1595] In 1596 he was made a Queen's Counsel, but missed the appointment of Master of the Rolls. During the next few years, his financial situation remained bad. His friends could find no public office for him, a scheme for retrieving his position by a marriage with the wealthy widow Lady Elizabeth Hatton failed, and in 1598 he was arrested for debt. His standing in the queen's eyes, however, was beginning to improve. She had begun to employ him in crown affairs a few years previously, and he gradually acquired the standing of one of the learned counsel, though he had no commission or warrant and received no salary. His relationship with the queen also improved when he severed ties with Essex, a fortunate move considering that the latter would be executed for treason in 1601; and Bacon was one of those appointed to investigate the charges against him, and examine witnesses, in connection with which he showed an ungrateful and indecent eagerness in pressing the case against his former friend and benefactor. This act Bacon endeavoured to justify in A Declaration of the Practices and Treasons, etc., of ... the Earl of Essex, etc. He received a gift of a fine of £1200 on one of Essex's accomplices. The accession of James I brought Bacon into greater favour; he was knighted in 1603, and endeavoured to set himself right with the new powers by writing his Apologie (defence) of his proceedings in the case of Essex, who had favoured the succession of James. In the course of the uneventful first parliament session Bacon married Alice Barnham, the daughter of a well-connected London alderman. Little or nothing is known of their married life. In his last will he disinherited her. However, substantial evidence suggests that Bacon's emotional interests lay elsewhere. John Aubrey in his Brief Lives states that Bacon was "a pederast". Bacon's fellow parliamentary member Sir Simonds D'Ewes in his Autobiography and Correspondence writes of Bacon: "yet would he not relinquish the practice of his most horrible & secret sinne of sodomie, keeping still one Godrick, a verie effeminate faced youth, to bee his catamite and bedfellow". Bacon's mother Lady Ann Bacon expressed clear exasperation with what she believed was her son's behaviour. In a letter to her other son Anthony, she complains of another of Francis's companions "that bloody Percy" whom, she writes, he kept "yea as a coach companion and a bed companion". Bacon exhibited a strong penchant for young Welsh serving-men. One such person, Francis Edney, received the enormous sum of two hundred pounds in Bacon's will. Meanwhile (in 1608), he had entered upon the Clerkship of the Star Chamber, and was in the enjoyment of a large income; but old debts and present extravagance kept him embarrassed, and he endeavoured to obtain further promotion and wealth by supporting the king in his arbitrary policy. However, Bacon's services were rewarded in June 1607 with the office of Solicitor. In 1610 the famous fourth parliament of James met. Despite Bacon's advice to him, James and the Commons found themselves frequently at odds over royal prerogatives and the king's embarrassing extravagance, and the House was dissolved in February 1611. Through this Bacon managed in frequent debate to uphold the prerogative, while retaining the confidence of the Commons. In 1613, Bacon was finally able to become attorney-general, by dint of advising the king to shuffle judicial appointments; and in this capacity he would prosecute Somerset in 1616. The parliament of April 1614 objected to Bacon's presence in the seat for Cambridge—he was allowed to stay, but a law was passed that forbade the attorney-general to sit in parliament—and to the various royal plans which Bacon had supported. His obvious influence over the king inspired resentment or apprehension in many of his peers. Bacon continued to receive the King's favor, and in 1618 was appointed by James to the position of Lord Chancellor. In his great office B. showed a failure of character in striking contrast with the majesty of his intellect. He was corrupt alike politically and judicially, and now the hour of retribution arrived. His public career ended in disgrace in 1621 when, after having fallen into debt, a Parliamentary Committee on the administration of the law charged him with corruption under 23 counts; and so clear was the evidence that he made no attempt at defence. To the lords, who sent a committee to inquire whether the confession was really his, he replied, "My lords, it is my act, my hand, and my heart; I beseech your lordships to be merciful to a broken reed." He was sentenced to a fine of £40,000, remitted by the king, to be committed to the Tower during the king's pleasure (which was that he should be released in a few days), and to be incapable of holding office or sitting in parliament. He narrowly escaped being deprived of his titles. Thenceforth he devoted himself to study and writing. However, Nieves Mathews in her book, Francis Bacon: The History of a Character Assassination, Yale University Press, alleges that Bacon was completely innocent of the bribery charges and that writers from later times were themselves guilty of slandering Bacon's reputation. Bacon commenting on his impeachment as Chancellor in which he claims to have been forced to plead guilty to bribery charges in order to save King James from a political scandal stated:

I was the justest judge, that was in England these last fifty years. When the book of all hearts is opened, I trust I shall not be found to have the troubled fountain of a corrupt heart. I know I have clean hands and a clean heart. I am as innocent of bribes as any born on St. Innocents Day.

Death

Lord Chancellor]] Francis Bacon's death had a considerable element of irony. In March, 1626, he came to London, and shortly after, when driving on a snowy day, he was inspired by the possibility of using snow to preserve meat. Bacon purchased a chicken (fowl) to investigate this possibility, but, during the endeavour of stuffing it with snow, contracted a fatal case of pneumonia. He died at Highgate on April 9, 1626, leaving assets of about £7,000 and debts to the amount of £22,000.

Works and Philosophy

Bacon's works include his Essays, as well as the Colours of Good and Evil and the Meditationes Sacrae, all published in 1597. His famous aphorism, "knowledge is power", is found in the Meditations. Bacon also wrote In felicem memoriam Elizabethae, a eulogy for the queen written in 1609; and various philosophical works which constitute the fragmentary and incomplete Instauratio magna, the most important part of which is the Novum Organum (published 1620). Bacon did not propose an actual philosophy, but rather a method of developing philosophy; he wrote that, whilst philosophy at the time used the deductive syllogism to interpret nature, the philosopher should instead proceed through inductive reasoning from fact to axiom to law. Before beginning this induction, the inquirer is to free his mind from certain false notions or tendencies which distort the truth. These are called "Idols" (idola), and are of four kinds: "Idols of the Tribe" (idola tribus), which are common to the race; "Idols of the Den" (idola specus), which are peculiar to the individual; "Idols of the Marketplace" (idola fori), coming from the misuse of language; and "Idols of the Theater" (idola theatri), which result from an abuse of authority. The end of induction is the discovery of forms, the ways in which natural phenomena occur, the causes from which they proceed. Bacon's developments of the inductive philosophy would revolutionize the future thought of the human race. Bacon's somewhat fragmentary ethical system, derived through use of his methods, is explicated in the seventh and eighth books of his De augmentis scientiarum (1623). He distinguishes between duty to the community, an ethical matter, and duty to God, a purely religious matter. Any moral action is the action of the human will, which is governed by reason and spurred on by the passions; habit is what aids men in directing their will toward the good. No universal rules can be made, as both situations and men's characters differ. Bacon distinctly separated religion and philosophy, though the two can coexist. Where philosophy is based on reason, faith is based on revelation, and therefore irrational—in De augmentis he writes that "[t]he more discordant, therefore, and incredible, the divine mystery is, the more honor is shown to God in believing it, and the nobler is the victory of faith."

Posthumous reputation

Bacon's ideas about the improvement of the human lot were influential in the 1740s and 1750s among a number of Parliamentarian scholars. In the Restoration Bacon was commonly invoked as a guiding spirit of the new-founded Royal Society. In the nineteenth century his emphasis on induction was revived and developed by William Whewell, among others. Bacon was ranked #90 on Michael H. Hart's list of the most influential figures in history.

Bacon and Shakespeare

Since the nineteenth century a number of writers have extended Bacon's acknowledged body of work by claiming that Bacon was the author of the plays usually attributed to William Shakespeare. There is evidence for this via Bacon's Shakespeare notebook, The Promus, and The Northumberland Manuscript. See: Shakespearean authorship.

Summary

ImageSize = width:450 height:450 PlotArea = left:50 right:0 bottom:10 top:10 DateFormat = yyyy Period = from:1560 till:1630 TimeAxis = orientation:vertical ScaleMajor = unit:year increment:5 start:1560 ScaleMinor = unit:year increment:1 start:1560 PlotData= color:red mark:(line,black) align:left fontsize:S shift:(25,0) # shift text to right side of bar # there is no automatic collision detection, # so shift texts up or down manually to avoid overlap shift:(25,-10) at:1561 text:Born at London at:1573 fontsize:XS text:Ed. at Trinity Coll. Cambridge; dissatisfied with Aristotlean philosophy at:1579 text:Enters Gray's Inn from:1576 till:1579 text:In France at:1582 text:Called to Bar at:1584 text:Enters Parliament at:1591 text:Becomes friend of Essex at:1593 text:Essex presents him with estate at:1597 text:Publishes first ed of Essays at:1601 text:Prosecutes Essex at:1605 text:Publishes Advancement of Learning at:1607 text:Solicitor General at:1609 text:Publishes Wisdom of the Ancients at:1613 text:Attorney General at:1616 text:Prosecutes Somerset at:1618 fontsize:XS text:Lord Keeper at:1619 fontsize:XS text:Lord Chancellor with title of Verulam at:1620 fontsize:XS text:Publishes Novum Organum at:1621 fontsize:XS text:Viscount St. Albans; Charged with corruption, retires from public life. at:1622 fontsize:XS text:Publishes Henry VII and third part of Instauratio at:1626 text:Dies

Notes

# Bacon's sexual orientation is discussed in detail at the website [http://www.infopt.demon.co.uk/baconfra.htm Gay History and Literature].

References

-
-
- Some material originally from the 1911 Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religion.

External links

-
- [http://www.classic-literature.co.uk/british-authors/16th-century/francis-bacon/ Francis Bacon Books]
- [http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/aut/bacon_francis.html Online editions of Bacon's works]
- [http://www.sirbacon.org/ Sir Francis Bacon's New Advancement of Learning]
- [http://www.hirohurl.net/engren.html Essays on the English Renaissance]
- [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-25 Dictionary of the History of Ideas:] Baconianism
- [http://www.infopt.demon.co.uk/baconfra.htm Rictor Norton, "Sir Francis Bacon"] quotes excised passages of Sir Simonds D'Ewes
- [http://www.quotationsbook.com/authors/377/Bacon_Francis Quotations Book - Francis Bacon]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry]
- [http://www.twickenham-museum.org.uk/detail.asp?ContentID=184 The Twickenham Museum - Sir Francis Bacon]
- [http://www.henrywotton.org.uk/ Henry Wotton employed by Bacon's intelligence system]
- [http://www.fbrt.org.uk/frameset.html Francis Bacon Research Trust - Studies of Bacon's connections to the Rosicrucians, Freemasonry, Shakespeare]
- [http://http://nrg78.com/ipw-web/b2/index.php?m=20051017#108 - For knowledge itself is power: a blog post that compares Bacon to Machiavelli.] Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Category:Empiricists Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon, Francis St Albans, Viscount 01-001 ko:프랜시스 베이컨 ja:フランシス・ベーコン (哲学者)

Spinoza

Benedictus de Spinoza (November 24, 1632 – February 21, 1677), was named Baruch Spinoza by his synagogue elders and known as Bento de Espinosa or Bento d'Espiñoza in his native Amsterdam. Along with René Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz, he was one of the great rationalists of 17th-century philosophy. He is considered the founder of modern Biblical criticism. His magnum opus was the Ethics.

Life

Born to a Sephardic family among the Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam, he gained fame for his positions of pantheism and neutral monism, as well as the fact that his Ethics was written in the form of postulates and definitions, as though it were a geometry treatise. In the summer of 1656, he was excommunicated because of apostasy from the Jewish community for his claims that God is the mechanism of nature and the universe, having no personality, and that the Bible is a metaphorical and allegorical work used to teach the nature of God, both of which were based on a form of Cartesianism (see René Descartes). Following his excommunication, he adopted the first name Benedictus (the Latin equivalent of his given name, either Baruch or Bento). The terms of his excommunication were quite severe; excerpts from the text may be found at [http://www.mnstate.edu/mouch/spinoza/excomm.html]. After his excommunication, he lived and worked for a while in the school of Franciscus van den Enden, who taught him Latin and perhaps also introduced him to modern philosophy. In this period Spinoza also became acquainted with several Collegiants, members of a non-dogmatic and interdenominational sect with tendencies towards Rationalism. By the beginning of the 1660s Spinoza's name became more widely known and he was visited by Henry Oldenburg, with whom he would maintain a correspondence for the rest of his life. Spinoza's first publication was on the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, but already in that work he introduced some of his own ideas. In 1665 he notified Oldenburg that he had started to work on a new book, the Theologico-Political Treatise, published in 1670. Since the public reactions to the anonymously published Theologico-Political Treatise turned unfavourable to his brand of [http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/descarte.htm] Cartesianism, he abstained from publishing more of his works. The Ethics and all other works, apart from the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy and the Theologico-Political Treatise, were published after his death in the Opera postuma edited by his friends. Some of the major figures whom Spinoza met include Henry Oldenburg and Leibniz.

Philosophy

Known as both the "greatest Jew" and the "greatest Atheist", Spinoza contended that God and Nature were two names for the same reality, namely the single substance (meaning "to stand beneath" rather than "matter") that underlies the universe and of which all lesser "entities" are actually modes or modifications. The argument for this single substance runs something as follows: :1. Substance exists and cannot be dependent on anything else for its existence. :2. No two substances can share an attribute. ::Proof: If they share an attribute, they would be identical. Therefore they can only be individuated by their modes. But then they would depend on their modes for their identity. This would have the substance being dependent on its mode, in violation of premise 1. Therefore, two substances cannot share the same attribute. :3. A substance can only be caused by something similar to itself (something that shares its attribute). :4. Substance cannot be caused. ::Proof: Something can only be caused by something which is similar to itself, in other words something that shares its attribute. But according to premise 2, no two substances can share an attribute. Therefore substance cannot be caused. :5. Substance is infinite. ::Proof: If substance were not infinite, it would be finite and limited by something. But to be limited by something is to be dependent on it. However, substance cannot be dependent on anything else (premise 1), therefore substance is infinite. :Conclusion: There can only be one substance. ::Proof: If there were two infinite substances, they would limit each other. But this would act as a restraint, and they would be dependent on each other. But they cannot be dependent on each other (premise 1), therefore there cannot be two substances. Spinoza contended that "Deus sive Natura" ("God or Nature") was a being of infinitely many attributes, of which extension and thought were two. His account of the nature of reality, then, seems to treat the physical and mental worlds as two different, parallel "subworlds" that neither overlap nor interact. This formulation is a historically significant panpsychist solution to the mind-body problem known as neutral monism. Spinoza was a thoroughgoing determinist who held that absolutely everything that happens occurs through the operation of necessity. For him, even human behaviour is fully determined, freedom being our capacity to know we are determined and to understand why we act as we do. So freedom is not the possibility to say "no" to what happens to us but the possibility to say "yes" and fully understand why things should necessarily happen that way. By forming more "adequate" ideas about what we do and our emotions or affections, we become the adequate caus

Teleology

Classical Greek teleology

Extrinsic and intrinsic finality

Teleology and modern philosophy

See also

References

Philosophical naturalism

Methodological naturalism versus ontological naturalism

Naturalism as epistemology

Naturalism and philosophy of mind

History

Criticism of naturalism

See also

Neutral links

Supportive links

Critical links

Lucretius

External links

References

Phaedo

Immortality of the soul

Detailed summary

Last Days of Socrates

Final cause

External links

Intrinsic finality

Anthropic principle

Origin

Proponents and versions

The Anthropic Cosmological Principle

Anthropic principle in string theory

Anthropic bias and anthropic reasoning

See also

References

External links

Footnote

Superstition

Superstition and behavioral psychology

Religious views on the subject of superstition

See also

Books

External links

Source

Francis Bacon

Early life

Career

Death

Works and Philosophy

Posthumous reputation

Bacon and Shakespeare

Summary

Notes

References

External links

Spinoza

Life

Philosophy